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Abstract
I present three essays on the economics of crime. The rst considers an
activity associated with 55% of all criminal o¤ences in the UK: binge drinking.
One group inextricably linked with such behaviour is the sports team. Members
regularly engage in post-match drinking, where the teams reputation is at stake.
Teams often apply peer pressure (the threat of punishment for refusal to compete)
to ensure each member gets involved. Chapter 1 presents a simple model of
competitive drinking, and evaluates the amount of peer pressure a team needs to
apply when multiple equilibria exist.
The thesis then turns attention towards criminal organisations. Chapter 2
discusses the use of initiation by protection rackets. Such rituals are widely used,
and serve several purposes. Firstly, they allow initiates skills to be assessed.
Secondly, they act as an incentive to invest in skills. Thirdly, they signal to the
rackets customers. The chapter derives conditions on the underlying distribu-
tion of abilities such that a racket can adjust initiation di¢ culty to improve its
reputation. It then discusses these conditions in light of key playerpolicies,
suggesting they may be more e¤ective than previously thought.
Chapter 3 evaluates the impact of a variety of anti-crime policies on how a
criminal gang recruits. Gangs counteract policy e¤ects by adjusting the wage
they o¤er and the intensity of violence they require their members to inict.
This can lead to policies backring; increasing the social cost of the gang. A
policy which reduces the youthsincentive to join a gang leaves only hardened
criminals as recruits. If gang size and violence are weak revenue complements,
this causes the gang to substitute towards more violence. Policies are therefore
most e¤ective when they not only reduce the incentive to join the gang, but also
increase youthssensitivity towards inicting violence.
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Chapter 1
Peer Pressure and Binge
Drinking
1.1 Introduction
Binge drinking is one of the most high prole issues facing modern British society.
A recent government report suggests that alcohol abuse costs the National Health
Service around £ 2.7 billion per year in England (Department of Health 2008).
This gure has seen a signicant increase over recent years, growing from £ 1.7
billion per year only ve years earlier (Cabinet O¢ ce 2003). The upsurge in
concern in policy, media and academic circles is therefore unsurprising.
Binge drinking is also the source of a wide variety of negative externalities. In-
creased morbidity, absenteeism and premature death resulting from alcohol abuse
are estimated to cost England around £ 6.4 billion per year in lost productivity
(Cabinet O¢ ce 2003). Moreover, the cost of alcohol-fuelled crime (including
victimisation costs) was estimated at around £ 11.9 billion per year. Matthews,
Shepherd, and Sivarajasingham 2006 show that alcohol consumption is a sig-
nicant risk factor in admission to hospital as a result of being injured due to
violence. Moreover, they suggest that this relationship is causal. They found
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that increases in the price of beer in the UK signicantly reduced the number
of hospital admissions, even when controlling for numerous socioeconomic and
seasonal variables. It is this relationship to crime that often captures the head-
lines. Thirty percent of all recorded crime in the UK in 2003 was committed by
young binge drinkers (compared with 17% for other young people), with binge
drinkers of all ages accounting for 55% of all o¤ences (Home O¢ ce 2005). Whilst
it is important to di¤erentiate between correlation and causation, 63% of young
binge drinkers surveyed claimed to have been involved in criminal or disorderly
behaviour whilst drunk in the last twelve months. Twenty-ve percent claimed
to have been involved in a ght.
What is the extent of the problem? According to a survey conducted by the
Home O¢ ce, 62% of young men1 and 47% of young women are classed as binge
drinkers, claiming to feel very drunk at least once a month for the last twelve
months (Home O¢ ce 2006). Perhaps more worryingly, 28% of boys, and 32%
of girls aged 10-15 reported binge drinking. The issue is not restricted to the
UK. In the US, many universities and colleges have adopted an alcohol policy
in response to the e¤ects of binge drinking. In a recent survey of online policies
(Faden and Baskin 2002), 73% of colleges sampled did not allow consumption of
alcohol in public places. Moreover, 36% of institutions explicitly forbade the use
of alcohol references in advertising by student groups. In 78% of cases, breaches
of the policy could result in suspension, and in 82% even expulsion.
Particularly amongst young people, peer pressure may play an important
role in shaping the decision to binge drink. Youths are forced to spend time
with the same group of individuals every day at school. This has additional
strength during the teenage years, as socialising and establishing identity as part
of a group is particularly important. Individuals may be willing to engage in
personally costly actions to protect this. I dene peer pressure as the (implicit
1Dened as those between eighteen and twenty-ve years old.
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or explicit) cost a group imposes on its members for not engaging in a particular
activity.
The specic example of peer pressure that I shall discuss in this paper is that of
binge drinking amongst members of sports teams. After sporting competitions,
particularly when representing a university, it is common for clubs to engage
in drinking games. These games are highly competitive, and involve copious
amounts of alcohol. Usually, the aim is to consume your drink faster than your
opponent. For example, consider a boat race. In a boat race, each university
elds a team of four players. The two teams then stand in line with a drink
each. Upon hearing the command to begin, the rst member of each team drinks
their drink. As soon as they have nished, the next member of their team begins
consuming their drink. The winners are the team who nish all four drinks in the
shortest time. Such activities, although perhaps fun to begin with, soon lose their
appeal. When several universities are gathered together, it is not uncommon to
turn the boat race into a knock-out tournament, with nalists perhaps drinking
as many as four beverages within fteen minutes prior to reaching the nal round.
However, despite the inevitable feelings of illness, students still line up against
members of the opposing university in the nal, so as not to bring shame upon
the team. Key features of this scenario are that, when presented with a member
of an opposing team, a player does not know how well they can hold their alcohol.
Moreover, as the pride of their team is at stake, they are likely to feel pressured
into engaging in the game, as to back out immediately would look bad, and
may result in some form of group punishment. The model described in the
following section aims to include these features. Note that, under the hypothesis
that drinking games are individually costly, nobody should engage in them in an
e¢ cient setting. Thus peer pressure introduces an ine¢ ciency, by forcing players
to get involved.
10
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Empirical research suggests that a large part of measured peer e¤ects may be
due to self-selection of peers. Consider, for example, a person with a higher than
average propensity to use drugs. It may be the case that they seek out other with
similar propensities and form a group. When observing the group, an outsider
would see a lot of people using drugs and may mistakenly attribute it to peer
pressure. This has led to a major discrepancy between the theoretical literature
on peer pressure and empirical observation, which I hope to rectify in this pa-
per. The model I present restricts attention to situations where peer pressure is
likely to be pervasive. Specically, I model circumstances in which there are two
opposing peer groups, competing against each other. I propose that under such
conditions, each individual will feel pressured by his/her compatriots to engage
in (individually costly) activities so as not to let the side down. Competition
seems to play a key role in determining the identity of the group. Although self-
selection into peer groups is still an issue, I would suggest that peer e¤ects are
likely to be an important factor. In many such situations, there are numerous
benets to being a member of a particular peer group, e.g. a sense of group
identity, friendship etc. The costly activity I model should be considered to be a
necessary evil. The key result of the paper is a testable hypothesis regarding the
minimum (and hence optimum, if the application of peer pressure is itself costly)
amount of peer pressure that needs to be applied to agents in such a situation,
given a particular prior distribution of players and cost of acquiring information.
I also show that peer pressure results in ine¢ ciencies related to this cost.
Although I do not claim that all binge drinking is a result of sports teams
engaging in drinking games, I would suggest that a proportion of it is. Moreover,
it seems plausible that competitive behaviour amongst young drinkers extends
beyond drinking games. For example, individuals may be chastised, or even
bullied, for not keeping up with their colleagues, or for consuming drinks with
11
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lower alcohol content. This could also be considered a form of peer pressure.
However self-selection is likely to be more of an issue in this case, which is why
I restrict attention to circumstances in which there is an explicit competitive
aspect to drinking behaviour.
The remainder of this paper is set out as follows. In section 1.2 I review
the relevant empirical and theoretical literature. In section 1.3, I describe peer
pressure as a simple dynamic game of incomplete information. In section 1.4, I
begin to analyse the model. under the assumption that each team applies su¢ -
cient peer pressure to ensure all its members engage in drinking games. I outline
various equilibria in which signals are acquired (or not), and give conditions for
their existence. I return to the idea of peer pressure in section 1.5 and attempt
to derive a threshold level of peer pressure that ensures players choose to partici-
pate in the drinking game, given that they may be unaware of which equilibrium
they will end up in at the moment they decide to enter. I make some concluding
comments in section 1.6.
1.2 Literature Review
Economists have long recognised the importance of reference points in economic
decisions. As early as the 1930s, John Maynard Keynes (Keynes 1936) suggested
that workers reference around their nominal wages. He further postulated that
they would not accept falls in their nominal wages, resulting in a permanent
disequilibrium in the labour market. The inclusion of reference points in both
macroeconomics and, more importantly for this paper, microeconomics has since
ourished. Habit formation has long been an established part of the literature
on intertemporal choice, helping to explain why agents would choose to consume
more and save less. In a seminal paper, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) adopted
a psychological approach (which later became known as behavioural economics)
12
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in order to consolidate the Allais paradox (Allais 1953) with expected utility the-
ory, and thereby enshrined the importance of reference points. Prospect theory
takes a far more exible approach to decisions under uncertainty, emphasising
that agents respond di¤erently to lotteries depending on how they are proposed.
For example, phrasing a given lottery in terms of money won may result in a
completely di¤erent decision compared to when the same lottery is phrased in
terms of money lost relative to the maximum possible payo¤.
Peer pressure is a particularly pertinent example of a reference point. It has
long been recognised by other social sciences that individuals often choose to
make similar decisions to those with whom they associate. I begin this section
by reviewing attempts to measure the e¤ects of peer pressure, emphasising the
problems of endogeneity arising from self-selection, and commenting on the re-
sults. I then turn attention to three main theoretical approaches explaining why
agents may choose to take similar actions to their peers.
1.2.1 Empirical Work
Several attempts have been made over the last twenty years to measure the
e¤ects of peer pressure using panel data. The rst major study was conducted
by Evans, Oates, and Schwab 1992. In this study the authors identied potential
endogeneity problems that would likely occur when attempting to come up with
a measure of peer pressure. These issues arise from the fact that agents have a
certain amount of choice with regard to their peers. Consequently in observing,
for example, a group of drug users, it may be the case that each member of
the group has a higher than average propensity for drug use. When choosing a
group of people to associate with, it is very likely that these individuals will seek
out peers with a similar high propensity for drug use It is therefore often very
di¢ cult to disentangle the peer e¤ects from these individual propensities when
13
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conducting econometric analysis. What, in a simple analysis may appear to be a
strong peer e¤ect, may in fact simply be the result of individuals with a higher
propensity for an activity grouping together. In their study, Evans et al consider
a teenagers propensity to become pregnant, and estimate peer e¤ects in a probit
setting. They run two regressions, rst based upon a single equation model,
and then a set of simultaneous equations (where the teenagers peer group is
considered to be endogenous2). They nd that the peer group e¤ect is signicant
and positive in the single equation model. However, when they endogenise the
peer group, it not only becomes insignicant, but it changes sign as well. They
conclude that peer e¤ects can be attributed almost entirely to family choices in
this case. They nally derive the same result for teenagerspropensity to drop
out of school, again suggesting that peer e¤ects are less prevalent than previously
imagined.
Several more recent papers have found signicant peer e¤ects, even when
controlling for endogeneity. Gaviria and Raphael (Gaviria and Raphael 2001)
derived estimates of peer e¤ects on teenagers decision to use drugs, drink alcohol,
smoke cigarettes, attend church and drop out of school based on a two stage least
squares analysis of the National Education Longitudinal Study. They claim that
since students have no choice about their classmates, self-selection is less of a
concern. Their results show that peer e¤ects are positive and signicant for all
variables except for smoking, even when controlling for a wide variety of family
characteristics. They suggest that moving a teenager from a school where none
of his classmates use drugs, to one where half do, increases that probability
of drug use by sixteen percentage points. A similar situation with regard to
alcohol consumption increases the likelihood of drinking by roughly seventeen
percentage points. The results were shown to be reasonably robust by including
2Instruments used for the peer e¤ects were the metropolitan unemployment rate, median
family income, the poverty rate, and the percentage of adults who completed college.
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a wide variety of school e¤ects (another source of correlation between regressors
and errors).
McCarthy, Hagan, and Cohen 1998 also found signicant peer e¤ects for theft
amongst street gangs in Toronto and Vancouver, although, after acknowledging
the potential presence of endogeneity, they proceeded with an OLS analysis. They
claimed to nd little evidence of multicollinearity.
Whilst my work will no doubt su¤er from a certain amount of endogeneity, I
hope to minimise its e¤ects by considering peer groups where the main attraction
to members is not the costly activity they are currently engaged in. Returning
to the drinking example, most students (I would argue) do not join sports clubs
for drinking purposes, rather in order to keep t, and possibly to compete for
their university or college. Any self-selection is likely to be based upon sporting
ability, guaranteed by the clubs coaches. Although the social aspect may be
appealing, clubs are more likely to attract individuals with a higher than average
propensity for competition. This, if anything, is likely to ensure that members
have a strong sense of loyalty towards their respective clubs, and are hence less
likely to want to let the side down.
1.2.2 Theoretical Work
One argument, put forward by Sah 1991, is that peer pressure may be the man-
ifestation of positive network externalities associated with particular forms of
conformist behaviour. Consider, for example, a teenager deciding whether to
start taking drugs. If he/she observes very few people taking drugs, he/she may
be less inclined to begin experimenting. Given that the authorities use a xed
amount of resources on drug abuse recognition and punishment, the chance of
being caught are quite high, since the resources are concentrated. Now suppose
15
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he or she observes lots of people taking drugs. In this situation, police resources
will be spread thinly, and the probability of any one particular individual being
caught is relatively low. One can foresee that, in the second case, taking drugs
will seem far more appealing than in the rst.
Sah models an individuals propensity for crime as a function of aggregate
crime participation rates and the probability of punishment, both lagged over
several periods. This reects that the individual is unlikely to have perfect infor-
mation about current levels, and must hence form beliefs about current participa-
tion and probability of punishment. He then shows then the propensity for crime
is increasing in previous crime participation rates, and decreasing in the amount
of resources spent on criminal apprehension. Sah then extends his analysis to
consider a situation in which there are two distinct groups in the economy, both
of which choose whether to engage in the criminal activity. Under general condi-
tions, he then derives that there are positive spillovers between groups associated
with criminal activity. Essentially, an increase in criminal participation rates for
one group raises the rate of participation for the other, as the probability of being
caught falls.
In Sahs model, apparent peer pressure could be viewed as the observed ef-
fects of these positive network externalities. Whilst this may be true of criminal
behaviour, it is not necessarily the case for other costly activities. For example,
the model fails to explain why, returning to sports clubs, agents would choose to
engage in drinking games that, whilst immediately costly, cannot (by themselves)
result in prison sentences.
Another model of peer pressure is Akerlof 1997. His paper presents two al-
ternative quadratic utility functions. The rst, given below, is designed to mimic
the e¤ects of status. Let x be the an individuals consumption of a particular
good, and let x be the average individual consumption of that good in society.
16
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Akerlof suggests that following utility function:
 d (x  x)  ax2 + bx+ c (1.1)
Clearly, agents gain additional utility from consuming above average quanti-
ties of the choice good. The second, more relevant model describes conformity.
Akerlof suggests that agents care not only about their consumption in absolute
terms, but also relative the societal average:
 d jx  xj   ax2 + bx+ c (1.2)
Given these preferences, agents have an added incentive to consume similar
amounts to their peers. Akerlof shows that both these situations lead to the
potential for superoptimal consumption compared with preferences that have no
reference dependence, thus helping to explain why agents may engage in activ-
ities in groups that they would not necessarily undertake alone, such as drug
abuse or binge drinking. One could interpret the model outlined in this paper
as an attempt to nd a foundation for the behaviour predicted by these utility
functions.
Finally, sociologists have been concerned with peer e¤ects for a considerable
length of time. Many sociologists criticise game theory for the assumption that
agentsonly aim is to maximise their own personal utility. A classic example of
such behaviour is the prisonersdilemma. The socially optimal outcome is for
each player to co-operate, thereby ensuring that neither player serves a long jail
sentence. However, this is not a Nash equilibrium, as each has an incentive to
deviate and defect. Social dilemma theory argues that, rather than being my-
opic, players are able to reason collectively. So called collective rationality, they
argue, ensures that players not only aim to maximise their own utility, but also
17
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social welfare. Experimental economists have added weight to this idea, provid-
ing signicant evidence of a fairness motive in simple games (see, for example,
Ho¤man, McCabe, and Smith 1996). With regard to peer pressure, this conict
between maximising individual and collective welfare may help to explain why
agents choose to engage in actions that are personally costly, but make the group
better o¤.
1.3 The Model
I model peer pressure in the context of a dynamic game with incomplete in-
formation and observed actions. There is a large (nite) number of players,
i = 1; :::; 2N . Players are patient, i.e. do not discount future stages of the
game. In the rst stage, Nature allocates each player a type drawn from the set,
i = f"Strong"; "Weak"g. "Strong" types have a higher alcohol tolerance. Each
playerstype is private information of the player, but i is common knowledge.
Players have common priors over  = Ni=1i, which assign probability p to the
event that a particular player is "Strong" (and consequently 1  p to them being
"Weak"). Nature also allocates each player randomly to one of two opposing
sports teams, both of size N . Given the common priors assumption, each team
has a proportion p of "Strong"-types. A players team automatically learns their
type. However it remains unknown to their opponents.
Having been informed of their type and team, players then choose whether to
continue to engage in the drinking game. If the player chooses to withdraw, the
game ends and they pay a cost, c (i; p), where i 2 i is the players type. This
reects the peer pressure their team inicts for their refusal to continue. It is
assumed that there is a small but increasing cost to the team from applying this
pressure. Given this, the team will want to apply the minimum amount possible
to ensure entry.
18
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Why might a group apply such peer pressure? As previously mentioned, em-
pirical research suggests that peer pressure is not ubiquitous. Why then would it
be particularly pervasive amongst competitive peer groups? In situations where
peer groups compete, there is a feeling that the pride of the group is at stake.
Moreover, each member of the group cares about the groups reputation, and
thus su¤ers disutility when it is damaged. Consequently, any player who does
not engage in the drinking game inicts a negative externality upon the other
members of their team3. Avoidance of this externality may be su¢ cient incentive
for members of the team to pressurise the player into entering the game. In par-
ticular, members of the team may then partially ostracise or ridicule the player.
The fear of this occurrence is su¢ cient to ensure that the player participates in
the game.
In section 1.5, I will return to the cost associated with peer pressure, in an
attempt to discern the threshold amount of pressure that the team needs to apply
in order to ensure continuation.
Suppose that a player decides to remain in the game. Nature randomly pairs
them with another player from the opposing team of unknown type. Having
been paired with an opponent, the player then has the opportunity to acquire
a signal about their rival. For example, by o¤ering to buy their opponent a
drink, the player can glean important information about their attitude towards
alcohol by the drink that they request. If they request a double scotch, it is
likely that the player is "Strong", as it would be too costly for a "Weak"-type
to attempt to drink it. It is conceivable that this information will be su¢ cient,
given the simple two types model, to accurately assess their type. Note, also,
that the opponent observes that the signal has been acquired. This type of
signalling is a strengthening of the concept of hard information (Nelson 1974).
3One could also argue that they would inict a positive externality on members of the
opposing peer group.
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Hard information is something that cannot be faked, thus removing problems
associated with truthful revelation. However, with hard information the signaller
has the choice as to whether they reveal their signal. In this model, that is not
the case. The purpose of acquiring the signal is that, by doing so, the player
is better prepared to play the drinking game, where their payo¤s will be type-
dependent. However, their opponent is able to condition their drinking strategy
upon whether a signal was sought.
Suppose that two players i and j are paired against each other. Their action
in this stage is si; sj 2 S  fAcquire;Not Acquireg.
Finally, players engage in the drinking game. They play a simple simultaneous
moves game, choosing actions ai; aj 2 A  fC;Dg. C could be described as
"Chicken Out", i.e. stay for the rst drink, make apologies and leave. The action
D would refer to the alternative, namely entering into a heavy drinking session. In
each possible game, each type of player has a strictly dominant action. However,
the dominant action is di¤erent, depending upon the type of their opponent.
Specically, I assume that any player, when faced with "Strong" opposition,
would rather chicken out (take action C) than engage in a lengthy, and costly
game. A "Weak" player would be soundly beaten. A "Strong" player would nd
it too costly (both nancially, and in terms of the ensuing hangover). However,
any player facing a "Weak" opponent will strictly prefer to engage them (take
action D). "Strong" players will gain a victory for certain. Moreover, their pride
would be hurt if they chickened out when facing a weaker opponent. "Weak"
players will also want to play, as it provides an opportunity to engage in the
game relatively safely.
Consider a "Strong" player in the drinking game. Suppose that Nature has
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paired him/her with a "Strong" opponent. The payo¤s are described below:
"Strong"
"Strong"
C D
C
sS1
sS1
sS3
sS2
D
sS2
sS3
sS4
sS4
I restrict the set of possible payo¤ so that they satisfy the following conditions.
Assumption 1 (("Strong","Strong") Payo¤s) The payo¤s in the drinking
game between two "Strong" players satisfy the following ordering:
sS4 < s
S
2 < s
S
3 < s
S
1 < 0 (1.3)
Thus taking action C is a strictly dominant strategy for a "Strong" player when
faced with a "Strong" opponent in the perfect information subgame.
The two other possible player combinations are summarised below:
"Weak"
"Strong"
C D
C
wS1
sW1
wS3
sW2
D
wS2
sW3
wS4
sW4
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"Weak"
"Weak"
C D
C
wW1
wW1
wW3
wW2
D
wW2
wW3
wW4
wW4
I similarly restrict the set of possible payo¤s in the following ways
Assumption 2 (("Strong","Weak") Payo¤s) The payo¤s in the nal game
between a "Strong" and a "Weak" player satisfy the following orderings:
sW2 < s
W
4 < s
W
1 < s
W
3 < 0 (1.4)
wS4 < w
S
2 < w
S
3 < w
S
1 < 0 (1.5)
Thus a "Strong" player strictly prefers D to C when facing a "Weak" oppo-
nent, whereas a "Weak" player strictly prefers C to D when facing a "Strong"
opponent
Assumption 3 (("Weak","Weak") Payo¤s) The payo¤s in the nal game
between two "Weak" players satisfy the following ordering:
wW1 < w
W
3 < w
W
2 < w
W
4 < 0 (1.6)
Thus taking action D is a strictly dominant strategy for a "Weak" player
when faced with a "Weak" opponent in the perfect information subgame.
Summarising, the model proceeds as follows:
1. Players are allocated to one of two teams. Both they and their team are
informed of their type.
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2. Nature pairs members of opposing teams at random.
3. Players have the opportunity to withdraw from the game:
(a) If they withdraw, they su¤er disutility associated with peer pressure
and the game ends.
(b) If they remain in the game, the game continues.
4. Players can then acquire an accurate signal about their opponent. Their
opponent is informed if a signal is sought.
5. Players engage in a simultaneous drinking game, and payo¤s are realised.
1.4 Equilibria
In what follows, I focus on pure strategy symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria.
In this setting, such an equilibrium will consist of:
1. A peer pressure cost for every type of player, c (; p)  0, conditional on
the common priors of the teams.
2. A decision for each type regarding whether to withdraw from the game,
conditional on the peer pressure costs. and the common priors.
3. A decision for each type regarding whether to acquire a signal, s (i; c (i; p) ; p) 2
S, conditional on the peer pressure costs and the common priors.
4. An action for each type in the drinking game, a (si; sj; p) 2 A, conditional
on any signals acquired or sought and the common priors.
For the moment, I assume that each team threatens su¢ cient peer pressure
to ensure that no team members withdraw. The objective of the next section
will be to discern the minimum amount of pressure required to ensure that this
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is the case. As such, the remainder of this section will focus on the nal two
components of any equilibrium, namely the decision to acquire signals and the
subsequent action in the drinking game. Since all team members continue onto
this stage, a players initial beliefs about their opponents type upon being paired
with them are identical to their priors.
It is possible to distinguish between two types of equilibria, namely those in
which signals are acquired by at least one type of player, and those in which
neither type requests a signal. I consider each in turn, and derive necessary and
su¢ cient conditions for their existence.
1.4.1 Acquired Signal Equilibria
For every possible priors, there exists an equilibrium in which all players acquire
a signal about their opponent. These are summarised in the following:
Proposition 1 (All Acquire Signals) Consider the drinking game model with
su¢ cient peer pressure. For all p 2 [0; 1] there exists an equilibrium in which
both types of player acquire a signal. When facing a Strong opponent, they
subsequently take action C. Otherwise they subsequently take action D. Out of
equilibrium, should they fail to acquire a signal, then:
1. If p 2
h
0;min
n
sW3  sW1
sS1 sS3+sW3  sW1
;
wW4  wW2
wS2 wS4 +wW4  wW2
oi
, then both types will subse-
quently take action D;
2. If p 2

min
n
sW3  sW1
sS1 sS3+sW3  sW1
;
wW4  wW2
wS2 wS4 +wW4  wW2
o
;max
n
sW3  sW1
sS1 sS3+sW3  sW1
;
wW4  wW2
wS2 wS4 +wW4  wW2
o
,
then
(a) If s
W
3  sW1
sS1 sS3+sW3  sW1
<
wW4  wW2
wS2 wS4 +wW4  wW2
then "Strong" players will take ac-
tion C, whereas "Weak" players will take action D; or
(b) If s
W
3  sW1
sS1 sS3+sW3  sW1
>
wW4  wW2
wS2 wS4 +wW4  wW2
then "Strong" players will take ac-
tion D, whereas "Weak" players will take action C; or
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3. If p 2
h
max
n
sW3  sW1
sS1 sS3+sW3  sW1
;
wW4  wW2
wS2 wS4 +wW4  wW2
o
; 1
i
, then both types will subse-
quently take action C.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.
By acquiring a signal, each player is able to act optimally against their op-
ponent. Both their type and that of their opponent become common knowledge
between them. They consequently play the unique Nash equilibrium of whichever
payo¤ matrices they face. Out of equilibrium, a player who does not acquire a
signal knows that their opponent knows their type, and will take a dominant
action in the drinking game. Their best response thus depends upon both the
payo¤s they face, and their priors regarding the type of their opponent. If they
believe it su¢ ciently likely that their opponent is a "Weak" player, they will op-
timally take action D. Conversely, if they believe that their opponent is "Strong"
with su¢ ciently high probability then they will take action C.
One other symmetric equilibrium exists in which a signal is acquired, outlined
below:
Proposition 2 ("Strong" Acquire Signals) Consider the drinking game model
with su¢ cient peer pressure. For all p 2 [0; 1] there exists an equilibrium in which
only Strongplayers acquire a signal. In such an equilibrium:
1. Strongplayers will take action C if they face a Strongopponent, and
D otherwise; and
2. "Weak" players will take action C if their opponent acquired a signal, and
take action D otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix 1.B.
Given the equilibrium strategies, a "Weak" player is always strictly better
o¤ when he does not acquire a signal. If his opponent is "Strong", then there is
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no benet associated with acquiring a signal. In equilibrium, he learns that his
opponent is "Strong" by the very fact that they purchase a signal. Moreover, his
opponent learns his type, so he cannot convince his opponent that he is in fact
"Strong". Conversely, if his opponent is "Weak", purchasing a signal will make
the opponent believe that he is "Strong". Thus his opponent will take action C.
However, by assumption 3, he prefers it when the opponent plays D. As such, a
"Weak" player would never choose to acquire a signal.
If a "Strong" player were not to acquire a signal, her payo¤ would be unaf-
fected when facing a "Strong" opponent. As it is common knowledge between
them that her opponent acquired a signal, both players know their opponents
type with probability one. However, when facing a "Weak" opponent, she would
lose out. By not acquiring a signal, she would lead them to believe that she is
also "Weak". This would result in her opponent taking action D, rather than
C. This results in her receiving a lower payo¤, as she always prefers that her
opponent chicken out in the drinking game. Consequently, her expected payo¤
from not acquiring a signal is also strictly lower than that from acquiring a signal,
supporting the equilibrium strategies.
This proves to be the only equilibrium in which types separate over the ac-
quisition of a signal. In particular:
Proposition 3 ("Weak" Do Not Acquire Signals) Consider the drinking game
model with su¢ cient peer pressure. There exists no pure strategy symmetric per-
fect Bayesian equilibria in which "Weak" players acquire a signal and "Strong"
players do not.
Proof. See Appendix 1.C.
The lack of equilibria stems from the fact that "Weak" players wish to deceive
"Strong" players. Since "Strong" players do not acquire signals, their beliefs
about their opponent are formed by whether their opponent acquired a signal
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from them. Consequently, in an equilibrium in which "Weak" players acquire
signals, a "Strong" player will assume that, if their opponent does not acquire
a signal, their opponent is also "Strong". As a result, they will take action
C, rather than D, in the drinking game. Given the payo¤ structure when a
"Strong" player meets a "Weak" player, the "Weak" player is strictly better o¤.
Conversely, if their opponent is a "Weak" player, they acquire a signal in the
proposed equilibrium. As such, they respond optimally to the fact that they are
also a "Weak" player, and their payo¤ is una¤ected by the choice not to acquire
a signal. "Weak" players therefore receive a higher expected payo¤ through not
acquiring a signal, contradicting the equilibrium strategies proposed.
1.4.2 No Signal Equilibria
There are, of course, several other equilibria in which no players acquire signals
about their opponent. However, these equilibria are not supported for every
possible set of priors. Nevertheless, they are important if the teams are going
to apply su¢ cient peer pressure to ensure that their members always enter into
drinking games. Since all of these equilibria involve pooling at the signal acquisi-
tion stage, team members must rely on their common priors when deciding upon
which action to take. As such, these equilibria fall broadly into two categories.
Firstly, those supported by p close to zero or one. In these cases, players are suf-
ciently condent about the type of their opponent to induce pooling. Secondly,
there are those equilibria supported by p around one half. In these cases, there
is su¢ cient uncertainty to warrant separation. Considering each in turn:
Proposition 4 (Pooling No Signal Equilibria) Consider the drinking game
model with su¢ cient peer pressure. The following equilibria exist, such that no
player acquires a signal:
1. If p 2
h
max
n
sW3  sW1
sS1 sS3+sW3  sW1
;
wW3  wW1
wS1 wS3 +wW3  wW1
o
; 1
i
, all players take action C;
27
Peer Pressure and Binge Drinking Equilibria
and
2. If p = 0, all player take action D.
Proof. See Appendix 1.D.
Clearly, if p is su¢ ciently large, then players are condent that they are facing
a "Strong" opponent. As such, they opt to take action C. This is supported
in equilibrium by "Strong" playersout of equilibrium beliefs that anyone who
purchases a signal must be "Weak". They consequently then choose action D.
Since both types of player prefer a "Strong" player to take action C, neither type
has an incentive to deviate by acquiring a signal. If p = 0, players know almost
surely that their opponent is a "Weak". Consequently, they optimally choose
action D. This is supported by a range of out of equilibrium beliefs. If players
believe that an opponent who acquires a signal is "Weak" , then they will play D
irrespective. As such, there is no incentive to acquire a signal. If, instead, they
believe them to be "Strong", they will choose action C. Since, having acquired a
signal, a players opponent is almost surely "Weak", all types would prefer they
play D, providing a strict incentive not to acquire a signal.
Finally, turning attention to separating equilibria:
Proposition 5 (Separating No Signal Equilibria) Consider the drinking game
model with su¢ cient peer pressure. If:
p 2

sW4   sW2
sS1   sS3 + sW4   sW2
;
wW4   wW2
wS1   wS3 + wW4   wW2

then there exists an equilibrium in which no players acquire signals and:
1. Strongplayers will take action C; and
2. Weakplayers will take action D.
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Out of equilibrium beliefs are such that any player who faces an opponent who
acquires a signal takes action D.
Proof. See Appendix 1.E.
This equilibrium exists only if s
W
4  sW2
sS1 sS3+sW4  sW2
<
wW4  wW2
wS1 wS3 +wW4  wW2
. Strongplay-
ers are su¢ ciently convinced (p is high enough, given their payo¤s) that their
opponent is also Strong that they choose action C. Concurrently, p is low
enough that, given their payo¤s, Weak players still prefer to take action D.
They are still su¢ ciently convinced that their opponent is also Weak.
Under a fairly innocuous assumption, this proves to be the unique separating
no signal equilibrium:
Corollary 1 Consider the drinking game model with su¢ cient peer pressure. If:
wW4   wW1 < wS1   wS2
then Proposition 5 fully characterises the set of pure strategy separating equilibria
in which no players acquire a signal.
Proof. See Appendix 1.F.
The assumption in the corollary simply states that a Weakplayer has more
to lose by making a mistake against a Strong opponent than can be gained
against a Weakone. As such, when faced with an equilibrium in which Strong
players are taking action D and other Weak players are taking action C, they
always prefer to acquire information about their opponent.
1.5 Peer Pressure
Since entry into costly drinking games is often observed, it must be the case
that each team applies su¢ cient peer pressure to ensure that the its members
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are weakly better o¤ entering into a drinking contest than withdrawing. Whilst
a simple approach would be to make the cost of withdrawing greater than the
minimum payo¤ it is possible to receive in any game, this may prove costly for the
team itself. Moreover, given the common priors, the peer pressure threatened can
be conditioned on the realisation of p. This may ensure that a smaller amount
of peer pressure needs to be applied, reducing the cost to the team.
Given the existence of multiple equilibria, it may not be possible for the team
to distinguish precisely which equilibrium each pair is playing. As such, some
individuals may need more peer pressure applied than others, as they are entering
into a lower payo¤ equilibrium. If the team is unable to observe which pairs are
going to play which equilibrium, or if the equilibrium is not determined for each
team member prior to their being paired, it may be necessary for the team to
consider the worst case scenario. To ensure that no individual will withdraw
from the drinking game, it must therefore threaten a peer pressure cost at least
as great as the worst payo¤ an individual of a given type can receive, given the
distribution of types.
So, in order to calculate the amount of peer pressure required, it is necessary to
compute the expected payo¤ to an individual of each type for every equilibrium.
Clearly, all equilibria in which at least one type acquires a signal result in the
same expected payo¤. Prior to entering the drinking game, players know the
type of their opponent almost surely. Consequently, they know which set of
payo¤s they face, and best respond accordingly. Given that each set of payo¤s
incorporates a dominant strategy, the expected payo¤ for Strong is:
psS1 + (1  p) sW3 (1.7)
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Similarly for Weak players it is:
pwS2 + (1  p)wW4 (1.8)
This reects the fact that Strongplayers optimally play C against Strong
opponents andD against Weakones, whereas Weakplayers optimally choose
D and C respectively.
If no players acquire signals, their payo¤ depends upon which equilibrium is
played. Clearly, these equilibria do not always exist, and so the team may be con-
dent about applying less peer pressure for some sets of priors. In the two pooling
equilibria, the payo¤s depend upon whether players are su¢ ciently convinced that
their opponent is Strongor Weak. If p = 0, Strongplayers earn sW4 whereas
Weakplayers earn wW4 . Conversely if p  max
n
sW3  sW1
sS1 sS3+sW3  sW1
;
wW3  wW1
wS1 wS3 +wW3  wW1
o
,
Strong players earn psS1 + (1  p) sW1 whereas Weak players earn pwS1 +
(1  p)wW1 . Finally, in a separating no signal equilibrium, Strongplayers earn
psS1 + (1  p) sW2 whereas Weak players earn pwS3 + (1  p)wW4 .
In order to fully describe the peer pressure function, c (; p), it is necessary to
discuss several cases. These are dened by the relationship between the sets of
priors for which the various equilibria exist. In order to expedite this discussion,
it is useful to dene the following parameters:
Denition 1 The boundary values for the sets of priors over which the various
equilibria of the drinking game model exist are given by:
 q1  max
n
sW3  sW1
sS1 sS3+sW3  sW1
;
wW3  wW1
wS1 wS3 +wW3  wW1
o
;
 q2  s
W
4  sW2
sS1 sS3+sW4  sW2
; and
 q3  w
W
4  wW2
wS1 wS3 +wW4  wW2
.
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I will assume throughout that q2 < q3, so there are values of p for which the
separating no signal equilibrium exists. Ambiguity remains, however, regarding
the relationship between q1, the minimum value of p for which the pooling no
signal equilibrium exists, and q2 and q3. Considering each possibility in turn:
Case 1 If q1 < q2 then the peer pressure functions for each type of player are
given by:
c ("Strong"; p) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
sW4 p = 0
psS1 + (1  p) sW3 p 2 (0; q1)
psS1 + (1  p) sW1 p 2 [q1; q2)
psS1 + (1  p) sW2 p 2 [q2; q3]
psS1 + (1  p) sW1 p 2 (q3; 1]
c ("Weak"; p) =
8><>: pw
S
2 + (1  p)wW4 p 2 [0; q1)
min

pwS2 + (1  p)wW4 ; pwS1 + (1  p)wW1
	
p 2 [q1; 1]
Case 2 If q2 < q1 < q3 then the peer pressure functions for each type of player
are given by:
c ("Strong"; p) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
sW4 p = 0
psS1 + (1  p) sW3 p 2 (0; q2)
psS1 + (1  p) sW2 p 2 [q2; q3]
psS1 + (1  p) sW1 p 2 (q3; 1]
c ("Weak"; p) =
8><>: pw
S
2 + (1  p)wW4 p 2 [0; q1)
min

pwS2 + (1  p)wW4 ; pwS1 + (1  p)wW1
	
p 2 [q1; 1]
Case 3 If q3 < q1 then the peer pressure functions for each type of player are
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given by:
c ("Strong"; p) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
sW4 p = 0
psS1 + (1  p) sW3 p 2 (0; q2)
psS1 + (1  p) sW2 p 2 [q2; q3]
psS1 + (1  p) sW3 p 2 (q3; q1)
psS1 + (1  p) sW1 p 2 [q1; 1]
c ("Weak"; p) =
8><>: pw
S
2 + (1  p)wW4 p 2 [0; q1)
min

pwS2 + (1  p)wW4 ; pwS1 + (1  p)wW1
	
p 2 [q1; 1]
For Strongplayers, the best outcome would be to end up in an equilibrium
in which at least one type of player acquires a signal. This enables them to select
the dominant action against each type of opponent. In cases 1 and 2, this is
the unique equilibrium when p 2 (0;min fq1; q2g). In case 3, it is the unique
equilibrium for p 2 (0; q2) [ (q3; q1). As such, over these sets, the teams do not
need to threaten large amounts of peer pressure to ensure that Strong players
enter into the drinking game. When p = 0, however, they could nd themselves
in a pooling no signal equilibrium. They almost surely face a Weak opponent,
who expects that they are also Weak. They consequently receive a lower payo¤
(sW4 ) than they would receive from an acquired signal equilibrium (s
W
3 ), and the
peer pressure threatened must reect this.
Finally, when p  min fq1; q2g, other no signal equilibria become possible. In
any of these equilibria, Strong players take action C. Whilst this is dominant
when facing a Strong opponent (earning them sS1 ), it results in a strictly lower
payo¤when their opponent is Weak. As a result, more peer pressure is required.
The exact amount depends upon how Weak players behave. If p  q1, then
equilibria exist in which Weakplayers also choose C. Although this results in a
lower payo¤ than an acquired signal equilibrium, it still proves better than when
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Weak opponents choose D. When p 2 [q2; q3], Strong players can receive
sW2 < s
W
1 instead when facing a Weak opponent.
For Weak players it is unclear what the best possible outcome is. For
p < min fq1; q2g (cases 1 and 2) or p 2 [0; q2)[ (q3; q1) (case 3), the payo¤ players
can expect to receive is unique, namely pwS2 +(1  p)wW4 . Whilst this is the best
payo¤ they could hope for against a Weak opponent, they would be strictly
better o¤ if Strong opponents chose C rather than D. This is precisely the
action they take in no signal equilibria, unless p = 0. If p > q1, there exist
equilibria in which all players take action C. This improves their payo¤ against
Strong players, but reduces it against Weak opponents. Depending upon
whether the reduction dominates the improvement, the amount of peer pressure
the team needs to threaten may increase.
Note that Weak players receive a strictly higher payo¤ in a separating
no signal equilibrium than in an acquired signal equilibrium. Whilst Weak
opponents take the same action in both types of equilibria, Strong players are
su¢ ciently convinced that their opponent will be Strongto take action C. Since
this yields a higher payo¤ for a Weak player, separating no signal equilibria
have no e¤ect upon the amount of peer pressure each team must threaten its
weaker members with to ensure that they enter the drinking game.
1.6 Conclusions
Peer pressure is the minimum cost that a team must threaten inict upon a
member to ensure they enter into a costly activity. Empirical work has shown
that this is not as widespread as hitherto imagined. This results from the fact
that individuals often have some degree of choice over who they associate with,
leading to self-selection biases. In this paper, I have focused on a situation in
which I believe peer pressure still plays a large role in conformist behaviour: those
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where peer groups compete. Under such conditions, there is likely to be pressure
applied by teammates to ensure the individuals do not damage the pride of the
peer group.
The amount of peer pressure that needs to be applied is heavily depend upon
the magnitude of the payo¤s associated with the costly activity, and on the
prior distribution of players. In particular, as uncertainty regarding the type
of an opponent increases, so too does the cost a team must threaten to inict
upon a player to ensure that they engage in a costly activity. This is especially
interesting, as the agents in my model are risk neutral. By allowing individuals
to communicate with their opponents, it is possible to reduce the size of the peer
pressure, by enabling them to gain information about the type of their opponent.
This facilitates players choosing a better strategy in the costly activity, so as to
minimise their losses. This hypothesis could easily be tested in an experimental
setting, or by attempting to derive a measure of the costs inicted upon group
members who do not engage in activities and comparing it to the payo¤s of those
who do.
Peer pressure results in ine¢ ciency by ensuring that players enter into an
activity that is personally costly. If no peer pressure is applied, players have
no incentive to enter into the game, leading to an e¢ cient outcome whereby all
players receive a zero payo¤. However, if peer pressure is widespread, the threat
of peer pressure is su¢ cient to ensure that all players enter into the activity,
providing negative payo¤s. The social cost is reduced signicantly if players are
able to communicate with each other.
One future application of this model would be to coercive recruitment prac-
tices used by street gangs during gang wars (see, for example, Jankowski 1991).
During these periods of violence, it is not uncommon for gangs to change their
recruitment strategy. In peacetime, the emphasis is on getting individuals who
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are happy to join, and who will be loyal to the gang. However, when a war occurs,
gangs massively increase their demand for labour in order to protect their terri-
tory. These recruits tend to be threatened or bullied into joining for the duration
of the war. If one views ghts within a gang war in a similar manner to a drinking
game in this paper, then the amount of coercion required to recruit members is
equivalent to the amount of peer pressure teams threaten their members with.
A further extension would be to consider the optimal level of coercion a gang
applies, given that the number of victories or losses it su¤ers within a war will
be a function of both the number of members it has, and their ability to ght.
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1.A Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the proposed equilibrium. It is necessary to show that:
1. Both types acquire information; and
2. Should a player not acquire information, the action postulated in the equi-
librium are best responses to the actions of their opponent, given their
beliefs about their opponents type.
In any equilibrium in which all players acquire a signal, players know the
type of their opponent. As such, they can best respond in the perfect informa-
tion game. If all players acquire signals, the Nash equilibrium of each perfect
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information subgame is reached. Ex ante, Strong players who acquire a signal
receive:
psS1 + (1  p) sW3
For any p this is the highest they can receive. Thus, given the actions of the
other players, Strong players will always wish to acquire signals.
Weak players, on the other hand expect to receive:
pwS2 + (1  p)wW4
Since all players play D against a Weakplayer, this once again constitutes
the highest payo¤ Weakplayers can expect to receive ex ante. Thus acquiring
a signal is always a best response to the other playerspostulated strategies.
It remains to prove that the out of equilibrium actions are also best responses.
With probability one, a players opponent will acquire a signal. Since each perfect
information subgame has a dominant action, their opponents action is una¤ected
by the players lack of signal. Strongplayers who do not acquire a signal know
that their opponent will play C. The expected payo¤ from taking action C is
thus:
psS1 + (1  p) sW1
whereas the payo¤ from taking action D yields expected payo¤:
psS3 + (1  p) sW3
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AStrong player who has not acquired a signal will therefore taking action
C if and only if:
psS1 + (1  p) sW1  psS3 + (1  p) sW3
, p  s
W
3   sW1
sS1   sS3 + sW3   sW1
2 (0; 1)
Similarly, Weakplayers who do not acquire a signal know that their oppo-
nent will play D. Their expected payo¤ from taking action C is:
pwS2 + (1  p)wW2
whereas taking action D gives:
pwS4 + (1  p)wW4
AWeakplayer who has not acquired a signal will therefore taking action C
if and only if:
pwS2 + (1  p)wW2  pwS4 + (1  p)wW4
, p  w
W
4   wW2
wS2   wS4 + wW4   wW2
2 (0; 1)
So if p < min
n
sW3  sW1
sS1 sS3+sW3  sW1
;
wW4  wW2
wS2 wS4 +wW4  wW2
o
, both types take action D
if they fail to acquire a signal. If p > max
n
sW3  sW1
sS1 sS3+sW3  sW1
;
wW4  wW2
wS2 wS4 +wW4  wW2
o
,
both types take action C. Finally, if p 2
h
min
n
sW3  sW1
sS1 sS3+sW3  sW1
;
wW4  wW2
wS2 wS4 +wW4  wW2
o
;
max
n
sW3  sW1
sS1 sS3+sW3  sW1
;
wW4  wW2
wS2 wS4 +wW4  wW2
oi
and:
 sW3  sW1
sS1 sS3+sW3  sW1
<
wW4  wW2
wS2 wS4 +wW4  wW2
then Strongplayers take actionC, whereas
Weak players take action D; or
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 wW4  wW2
wS2 wS4 +wW4  wW2
<
sW3  sW1
sS1 sS3+sW3  sW1
then Strongplayers take actionD, whereas
Weak players take action C.
This completes the proof. 
1.B Proof of Proposition 2
In the proposed equilibrium, each Strong player learns the type of their op-
ponent. Moreover, since only Strong players acquire signals, Weak players
update their beliefs about their opponent based upon whether they received a
signal, such that:
W (Opponents  = StrongjOpponent acquired signal) = 1
Again, since each type has a dominant action in each perfect information
subgame, the equilibrium payo¤s are as before. For Strong players, it is:
psS1 + (1  p) sW3
and for Weak players it is:
pwS2 + (1  p)wW4
If a Strong player does not acquire a signal, their payo¤ is not a¤ected if
their opponent is also Strong. However, if their opponent is a Weak player,
they will be able to convince them that they are also Weak. Their opponent
will then play D rather than C. Their expected payo¤ from this strategy is:
psS1 + (1  p) sW4
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Clearly, since sW3 > s
W
4 by Assumption 2, Strong players strictly prefer to
acquire a signal in this equilibrium for any p.
If a Weak player acquires a signal, a Weak opponent will believe that
they are Strong. They will thus choose action C. Strong opponents also
acquire a signal, and consequently do not change their strategy. The expected
payo¤ from acquiring a signal is thus:
pwS2 + (1  p)wW3
By Assumption 3, wW3 < w
W
4 , so Weakplayers also strictly prefer playing their
equilibrium strategy. This completes the proof. 
1.C Proof of Proposition 3
Consider an equilibrium in which only Weak players acquire signals. I show
that Weakplayers strictly prefer not to acquire signals. For a Strongplayer:
S (Opponents  = StrongjOpponent acquired signal) = 0
Consequently, when facing an opponent who has acquired a signal, they optimally
take action D. Otherwise they take action C. The equilibrium payo¤ for a
Weak player is:
pwS2 + (1  p)wW4
Conversely, if they do not acquire a signal, they receive:
pwS3 + (1  p)wW4
By Assumption 2, wS3 > w
S
2 , so Weak players prefer a unilateral deviation
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from their equilibrium strategy. No such equilibrium can exist. This completes
the proof. 
1.D Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose that no player acquires a signal. Then, for both types of player, their
beliefs are such that:
 (Opponents  = StrongjOpponent did not acquired signal) = p
Suppose, rstly, that all players are taking action C. The equilibrium payo¤
for a Strong player is:
psS1 + (1  p) sW1
Conversely, were they to take action D;they would earn:
psS3 + (1  p) sW3
Following the equilibrium strategy yields a higher payo¤ if and only if:
psS1 + (1  p) sW1  psS3 + (1  p) sW3
, p  s
W
3   sW1
sS1   sS3 + sW3   sW1
2 (0; 1)
Similarly, a Weak players expected equilibrium payo¤ is:
pwS1 + (1  p)wW1
whereas a unilateral deviation to D would earn:
pwS3 + (1  p)wW3
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Following the equilibrium strategy yields a higher payo¤ if and only if:
p  w
W
3   wW1
wS1   wS3 + wW3   wW1
2 (0; 1)
So, if p  max
n
sW3  sW1
sS1 sS3+sW3  sW1
;
wW3  wW1
wS1 wS3 +wW3  wW1
o
, all players take action C, as
required, assuming no player acquires a signal. Acquiring a signal is an out of
equilibrium action. Setting:
S (Opponents  = StrongjOpponent acquired signal) = 0
W (Opponents  = StrongjOpponent acquired signal) = 1
ensures that the equilibrium is always supported. Strong players take action
D against an opponent who has acquired a signal, whereas Weak players take
action C. In particular, by acquiring a signal, a Strong player earns:
psS2 + (1  p) sW3
Not acquiring a signal is therefore optimal if:
psS1 + (1  p) sW1  psS2 + (1  p) sW3
, p  s
W
3   sW1
sS1   sS2 + sW3   sW1
By Assumption 1, sS2 < s
S
3 , so
sW3  sW1
sS1 sS2+sW3  sW1
<
sW3  sW1
sS1 sS3+sW3  sW1
and acquiring infor-
mation is never optimal over the support of the equilibrium for Strongplayers.
Similarly, the expected payo¤ from acquiring a signal for a Weak player is:
pwS2 + (1  p)wW3
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Not acquiring a signal is optimal if and only if:
p  w
W
3   wW1
wS1   wS2 + wW3   wW1
By Assumption 2, wS2 < w
S
3 , so
wW3  wW1
wS1 wS2 +wW3  wW1
<
wW3  wW1
wS1 wS3 +wW3  wW1
and acquiring
information is never optimal for Weak players.
Now consider the equilibrium in which all players take action D. The equi-
librium payo¤ for a Strong player is:
psS4 + (1  p) sW4
Conversely, were they to take action C;they would earn:
psS2 + (1  p) sW2
Following the equilibrium strategy yields a higher payo¤ if and only if:
psS4 + (1  p) sW4  psS2 + (1  p) sW2
, p  s
W
4   sW2
sS2   sS4 + sW4   sW2
2 (0; 1)
Similarly, a Weak players expected equilibrium payo¤ is:
pwS4 + (1  p)wW4
whereas a unilateral deviation to C would earn:
pwS2 + (1  p)wW2
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Following the equilibrium strategy yields a higher payo¤ if and only if:
p  w
W
4   wW2
wS2   wS4 + wW4   wW2
2 (0; 1)
In this equilibrium, suppose that:
S (Opponents  = StrongjOpponent acquired signal) = 1
W (Opponents  = StrongjOpponent acquired signal) = 0
Strong players take action C against an opponent who has acquired a signal,
whereas Weakplayers take action D. By acquiring a signal, a Strongplayer
earns:
psS1 + (1  p) sW4
Not acquiring a signal is optimal if and only if:
psS4 + (1  p) sW4  psS1 + (1  p) sW4
, p  0
Weak players expect to earn:
pwS1 + (1  p)wW4
Again, acquiring information is not optimal if and only if p  0. So, if p = 0, an
equilibrium in which no player acquires a signal and all players take action D is
possible. This completes the proof. 
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1.E Proof of Proposition 5
As with the proof of Proposition 1.D, in equilibrium:
 (Opponents  = StrongjOpponent did not acquired signal) = p
Suppose that no player acquires information, and consider the payo¤ to
Strong players. By taking action C, they expect to earn:
psS1 + (1  p) sW2
whereas taking action D yields:
psS3 + (1  p) sW4
A Strong player prefers to take action C if and only if:
psS1 + (1  p) sW2  psS3 + (1  p) sW2
p  s
W
4   sW2
sS1   sS3 + sW4   sW2
2 (0; 1)
By taking action C, a Weak player expects:
pwS1 + (1  p)wW2
whereas D yields:
pwS3 + (1  p)wW4
Weak players prefer D to C if and only if:
p  w
W
4   wW2
wS1   wS3 + wW4   wW2
2 (0; 1)
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So if p 2
h
sW4  sW2
sS1 sS3+sW4  sW2
;
wW4  wW2
wS1 wS3 +wW4  wW2
i
and no players acquire information,
the equilibrium is supported. As acquiring a signal is an out of equilibrium action,
dene:
S (Opponents  = StrongjOpponent acquired signal) = 0
W (Opponents  = StrongjOpponent acquired signal) = 0
All players take action D against an opponent who acquires a signal. For a
Strong player, acquiring a signal thus yields an expected payo¤ of:
psS2 + (1  p) sW4
They therefore prefer not to acquire a signal if and only if:
p  s
W
4   sW2
sS1   sS2 + sW4   sW2
Once again, by Assumption 1, this is always true over the specied support of the
equilibrium. For a Weakplayer, the expected payo¤ from acquiring a signal is:
pwS2 + (1  p)wW4
By Assumption 2, this is always strictly smaller than the equilibrium payo¤,
since p  wW4  wW2
wS1 wS3 +wW4  wW2
< 1. Thus no player wishes to acquire a signal. This
completes the proof. 
1.F Proof of Corollary 1
Firstly note that, since the support of the equilibrium in Proposition 5 is bounded
by each types incentive compatibility constraints, no other support can exist for
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an equilibrium in which Strong players do not acquire a signal and choose
action C, whereas Weak players do not acquire a signal and take action D.
Consider the decision of a Weakplayer in an equilibrium in which Strong
players do not acquire a signal and choose action D, whereas Weakplayers do
not acquire a signal and take action C. In equilibrium, they receive an expected
payo¤ of:
pwS2 + (1  p)wW1
The out of equilibrium beliefs about a player who acquires a signal can lead
to one of four possible pure strategy proles:
1. All players choose action C;
2. Strong players choose action C, whereas Weak players choose action
D;
3. Strong players choose action D, whereas Weak players choose action
C; or
4. All players choose action D.
Considering each in turn:
1.F.1 All players choose action C
By acquiring a signal, a Weak player chooses C against a Strong opponent,
and D against a Weak opponent. Their expected payo¤ is:
pwS1 + (1  p)wW3
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They will forego a signal if and only if:
pwS2 + (1  p)wW1  pwS1 + (1  p)wW3
, p  wS2   wS1 + wW3   wW1   wW3   wW1
By the assumption in the corollary, the left hand side is negative. Conversely,
by Assumption 3, the right hand side is positive. This yields a contradiction.
1.F.2 Strong players choose action C, whereas Weak
players choose action D
By acquiring a signal, a Weak player chooses C against a Strong opponent,
and D against a Weak opponent. Their expected payo¤ is:
pwS1 + (1  p)wW4
They will forego a signal if and only if:
pwS2 + (1  p)wW1  pwS1 + (1  p)wW4
, p  wS2   wS1 + wW4   wW1   wW4   wW1
By the assumption in the corollary, the left hand side is negative. Conversely,
by Assumption 3, the right hand side is positive. Once again, this yields a
contradiction.
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1.F.3 Strong players choose action D, whereas Weak
players choose action C
By acquiring a signal, a Weak player chooses C against a Strong opponent,
and D against a Weak opponent. Their expected payo¤ is:
pwS2 + (1  p)wW3
They will forego a signal if and only if:
pwS2 + (1  p)wW1  pwS2 + (1  p)wW3
, wW1  wW3
By Assumption 3, this is a contradiction.
1.F.4 All players choose action D
By acquiring a signal, a Weak player chooses C against a Strong opponent,
and D against a Weak opponent. Their expected payo¤ is:
pwS2 + (1  p)wW4
They will forego a signal if and only if:
pwS2 + (1  p)wW1  pwS2 + (1  p)wW4
, wW1  wW4
By Assumption 3, this is a contradiction.
Since no other pure strategy is possible, the separating no signal equilibrium
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in Proposition 5 must be unique. This completes the proof. 
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Chapter 2
Initiation and Protection Rackets
2.1 Introduction
Thus far, I have discussed groups whose members engage in activities closely
related to crime. In this chapter, and the one to follow, I take a more direct
approach by shifting the focus to organised crime. As noted towards the end
of Chapter 1, criminal organisations may engage in coercive recruitment during
times of need. This is tantamount to the peer pressure applied by sports teams
(although much more severe). However, this tends to be an option of last resort.
Those coercively recruited tend to have little allegiance to the organisation, un-
dermining its internal cohesion (Jankowski 1991). Instead, criminal groups prefer
to hire in much the same way as regular rms they o¤er a wage in exchange for
e¤ort. It is this approach, and its implications for policy, that I explore in the
remainder of the thesis.
Organised crime has long been an area of concern for policy makers and acad-
emics alike. It is the source of numerous negative externalities. These include vic-
timisation, the fear of crime, lost human capital and issues surrounding drug use.
Moreover, the cost of administering justice (incorporating prevention, detection
and punishment) is increasingly a matter for debate. In the United States, it is
51
Initiation and Protection Rackets Introduction
estimated that there are around 731,000 gang members (Egley and Howell 2011)
inicting a cost on society of around $465 billion per annum (based upon es-
timates by Cohen and Piquero 2009). In many northern European cities, the
prole of organised crime is growing (Bennett and Holloway 2004, Klein, Weer-
man, and Thornberry 2006). For example, Metropolitan Police Service (2012)
suggests that there are around 4,800 gang members in London. These individuals
are responsible for 22% of serious violence, 50% of shootings and 14% of rape in
the city. In southern Europe, the problem obviously has a very long history.
Of the various types of criminal organisation, the protection racket has re-
ceived the most attention from economists (see, for example, Gambetta 1996,
Skaperdas and Syropoulos 1997, Garoupa 2000, Dixit 2007). These groups use
violent intimidation to reduce the competition faced by their customers. Since
a comparative advantage for violence is necessary for the existence of any crimi-
nal group (they have no legal protection), many such organisations start out as
protection rackets, before moving into other illegal markets.
This paper presents a model of a protection racket, hereafter known as the
Maa1. Youths live in the Maas territory. These youths are heterogeneous
in two dimensions, reecting their intrinsic suitability for work in the primary
labour market and criminal sector respectively. Initially, youths are given the
opportunity to engage in juvenile crime. By doing so, they acquire criminal
skills. Juvenile crime is costly, but the cost is declining in a youths criminal
ability. They then choose which sector to work in. If they opt for the primary
labour market, they receive a wage related to their formal ability. If instead they
become a criminal, they join the Maa (becoming a maoso).
The Maa operates in the market for protection. Its customers (rms or
individuals) pay a fee to avoid violent intimidation by rivals. As such, maosi are
unable to signal the level of criminal skills they possess in equilibrium. Instead,
1Gambetta 1996 states that protection is the dening characteristic of maa groups.
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the amount the Maas customers are willing to pay depends upon the size of
the racket and its reputation for violence - the amount of criminal skill customers
believe each maoso has accrued. This will be the same for all maosi, and equal
to the expected amount of criminal skill across the organisation. As such, each
member of the racket generates identical revenue.
When youths join the Maa, they are forced to undertake an initiation. This
initiation is costly, but the cost is declining in the criminal skill a recruit pos-
sesses. It serves two purposes. Firstly, it allows the racket to accurately assess the
recruits level of criminal skill, and hence determines the recruits standing within
the organisations hierarchy. Secondly, the di¢ culty of initiation (although not
the cost each recruit su¤ers) acts as a signal to customers regarding both the
number of recruits the organisation is accepting and the distribution of crim-
inal skills amongst those recruits. They use this signal to update the Maas
reputation and hence their willingness to pay for protection.
Maosi are paid a wage that is proportional both to the revenue each mem-
ber generates and their standing within the organisation, subject to the Maas
budget constraint (Chang, Lu, and Chen 2005). Maas are often (despite their
portrayal in the media) relatively weak collectives of individuals (Jankowski 1991,
Klein, Weerman, and Thornberry 2006). As such, there is some evidence to sug-
gest that such organisations take a fairly utilitarian approach to recruitment.
Specically, they choose recruits to maximise the payo¤ to current members.
Since the number of current members is xed, this is equivalent to maximising
the revenue that each member is able to generate. By doing so, it is able to o¤er
a high wage to each member. It optimally adjusts initiation di¢ culty to trade o¤
reputational gains with size. If, instead it were to maximise total revenue, it may
be able to increase this further by recruiting more members. However, these ad-
ditional recruits would need to be paid, potentially reducing the bounty available
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to its original members. Jankowski 1991 provides some evidence of precisely this
approach. When interviewing a New York gang leader about their recruitment
strategy, they said:
Man, we dont let all the dudes who want to be let in in. We
cant do that, or I cant, cause right now were sitting good. We got
a good bank account and the whole gang is getting dividends. But
if we let in a whole lot of other dudes, everybody will have to take a
cut unless we come up with some more money, but that dont happen
real fast. So you know the brothers aint going to dig a cut, and if it
happens, then they going to be on me and the rest of the leaderships
ass and that aint good for us.[Jankowski 1991]
It is not, however, guaranteed that the Maa is able to do this. When initi-
ation becomes more di¢ cult, recruits with relatively low levels of criminal skill
decide to join the primary labour market instead. This improves the Maas rep-
utation, but also reduces the remaining membersrelative standing within the
racket. In turn, this causes more members to leave. The reputation improves
once more, and those who still remain su¤er a further decline in their standing.
This process could continue until the gang losses (almost) all of its members.
To ensure that increases in initiation di¢ culty leads to a nite increase in
reputation, and associated decline in size, it is su¢ cient for the hazard rate of
the distribution of criminal abilities (conditional on formal ability) to be bounded.
Each improvement in reputation will lead to fewer and fewer members leaving.
As such, each incremental reputational gain will decline to zero. This suggests
that the key player policies proposed by several papers on network economics
(for example Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou 2004 and 2010, Schwartz
and Rouselle 2009, Liu, Patacchini, Zenou, and Lee 2011) may be more e¤ective
than previously believed. By targeting those with relatively high criminal ability,
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these policies alter the distribution of abilities within the organisation, potentially
making it more di¢ cult for the Maa to control both reputation and size through
initiation. Conversely, targeting foot soldiers may prove detrimental.
2.2 Stylised Facts About Protection Rackets
2.2.1 Reputation in Protection Markets
The importance of a reputation for violence in determining a protection rackets
ability to generate revenue is widely accepted by criminologists. With reference
to the Sicilian Maa, Gambetta 1996 goes so far as to claim that a reputation
for violence is its most important commodity. A strong reputation means that
customers of the Maa are less likely to face intimidation by rivals. Rivals
expected cost of intimidation is higher, as the Maa is more likely to inict violent
retribution. As such, the Maa can charge a higher price to its customers, and
will need to engage in less violence (Reuter 1995, which is generally considered to
be costly). Katz 1988 makes similar observations with regard to American street
gangs. He suggests that many individuals are attracted to gangs to become part
of a, Street Elite. By associating with a gang, youths not only feel safer, but
are also able to engage in low level crime without fear of recrimination. Levitt
and Venkatesh 2000 conrm the value of association. In a unique analysis of a
drug gangs nances, they show that many youths actually pay a fee to the gang
in order to become associated with it. In this sense, whilst they call themselves
gang members (see, for example, Poutvaara and Priks 2009 and 2011) they are
in fact protection customers.
To illustrate the importance of reputation, consider a simple example in Fig-
ure 2.1. The protection racket can either be tough (with probability t) or weak.
The rackets customer, C, faces a threat from a rival (a loss of  K). If the pro-
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Figure 2.1: A simple model of protection
tection racket is tough, it can protect its customer from the rival. If it is weak,
it cannot. The customer does not know how tough the racket is. In this simple
framework, the customer decides whether to employ the racket or not, at price
P . Their maximum price they are willing to pay is tK. Clearly, if t is larger
(that is to say, the racket has a better reputation) they are able to charge a
higher fee. A similar argument can be made for an extortion racket (e.g. Bueno
De Mesquita and Hafer 2008), whereby the customer pays to avoid violence that
only a tough racket could inict. In both of these examples, the customer pays to
avoid being exposed to violence. In a more dynamic setting, violence is therefore
not an equilibrium outcome. The rackets reputation is su¢ cient to ensure that
the customer is protected, or that they pay extortion fees when required.
There are several other avenues through which a reputation for violence ben-
ets a Maa. Rackets with strong reputations are less likely to face compe-
tition within their territory (Silverman 2004). As such, they have a stronger
monopoly, and their members are able to extract larger rents (à la Milgrom and
Roberts 1982). Once again, violence is not an equilibrium outcome, as a strong
reputation is su¢ cient to deter entry.
The racket cannot operate in isolation. Inevitably, its members and customers
will acquire evidence of the organisations illegal activities. In order to prevent
them from sharing this information with law enforcers, a credible threat of vio-
56
Initiation and Protection Rackets Stylised Facts About Protection Rackets
lence is required. Indeed Baccara and Bar-Isaac 2008 suggest that the threat of
violence enables the racket to develop a relatively e¢ cient hierarchical structure.
This allows it to transmit information within the organisation with relative ease,
safe in the knowledge that its members will not inform the authorities.
2.2.2 Initiation as a Determinant of Reputation
It is clear from the above discussion that asymmetric information is rife within
the criminal sector. As violence is rare in equilibrium, there are few opportunities
for maosi to signal their skills to other members, or for the Maa itself to signal
to its customers. One widely used approach to circumventing this problem is the
use of initiation rituals. I dene initiation as any activity that recruits to the
racket undergo prior to becoming fully-edged members. Initiation tends to have
three transient features:
1. It enables the protection racket to learn how skilled its recruits are;
2. it is costly to the recruit, but this cost is declining in their criminal skill;
and
3. the procedure, if not the result, is publicised within the Maas territory.
The primary reason for initiating recruits is to discover their aptitude for
violence (Skaperdas 2001). Criminal gangs tend to organise into a hierarchical
structure. An individual members standing within that structure is often directly
related to how violent they are. Thus initiation provides an opportunity for the
Maa to discover where the recruit ts into this hierarchy. Those who perform
well during initiation may be promoted relatively quickly. Moreover, they are
likely to be allowed to skim additional earnings from the revenue they raise on
behalf of the organisation. The payo¤ they receive thus depends upon their
criminal skill relative to those of other maosi.
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There is also widespread evidence to suggest that initiation is costly. Decker
1996, for example, discussing several initiation rituals used by a drugs gang in
the United States. Some recruits were forced to fend o¤ a continued attack by
several members of the gang. They were accepted based upon their performance.
Jankowski 1991 reports similar rites in the gangs he studied. Decker also reported
that other gang members were required to walk through enemy neighbourhoods
wearing gang colours. They were accepted if they returned alive. In both of
these examples, there is a clear physical cost associated with initiation. However,
given that the gangs wished to determine aptitude, it is necessarily the case
that tougher recruits nd it easier. By observing the disutility a recruit su¤ers,
the Maa can thus learn their criminal skill. Furthermore, a di¢ cult initiation
increases the marginal benet of acquiring criminal skills, leading to higher skill
levels across all recruits to the organisation.
Other criminal organisations do not, at rst glance, appear to have costly
initiation. For example, Paoli 2003 suggests that initiation amongst the Italian
Maa families is largely ritualistic2. The initiate smears a few drops of blood on
a picture of a saint. This picture is then set alight, and whilst the picture burns
in their hands, the initiate recites an oath of allegiance. However, in order to
be initiated, the recruit must be vouched for by a, Man of honour,who has
been responsible for assessing their reliability prior to the ceremony. As such,
the ceremony serves more as a graduation. In a sense, the recruits initiation
took place whilst the man of honour was assessing them. In particular, it is
common that a recruit must rst, Make their bones,before being allowed to
undergo initiation. This tends be mean being involved in a Maa murder, or other
violent activity, upon which the men of honour can judge the recruits readiness
for initiation (see, for example, Raab 2006). This element of the process is clearly
2Morgan 1960 and Iwai 1986 discuss similarly ritualistic initiations within triad gangs in
Hong Kong and the Yakuza in Japan respectively.
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closer to those of the drug gangs.
Finally, initiation acts as a signal to the protection rackets customers regard-
ing the quality of its members. Whilst they are unlikely to be able to observe
precisely who is being initiated, or how they performed, they will be aware of
how di¢ cult the initiation was. They may observe members injuries resulting
from a beating, or be made aware of which organisation carried out a particular
murder. This aspect of initiation, to my knowledge so far unexplored, enables
customers to update their beliefs about the gangs reputation. Whilst they cannot
observe the precise aptitude for violence of each individual member, by observing
initiation di¢ culty they learn something about the distribution of skills. Only
relatively capable youths nd it protable to join the racket when the initiation
is di¢ cult. As such, it will be small, but with a tough reputation. Conversely, if
the initiation is easy, customers will know that a lot of youths join the gang, and
that some of them will consequently be reasonably inept. Since these beliefs will
dictate customerswillingness to pay for the rackets protection, it is essential
that it provides a clear advert. Given the relative scarcity of opportunities to
engage in violence, it is an important avenue that the protection racket exploits.
I therefore assume that the structure of the contract the Maa o¤ers is xed, so
that initiation di¢ culty contains all the information required for customers to
get an accurate picture of the Maas attributes.
2.2.3 Acquisition of Criminal Skills
How do youths become tough? Numerous works by Athens (summarised in
Rhodes 2001) suggest that many individuals convicted of violent crime went
through a common developmental process, dubbed violentisation. One impor-
tant aspect of this process is violent coaching. After initial bad experiences with
violence, Athens proposes that youths are coached to believe that violence is
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a correct and appropriate response to minor provocation. Youths not only be-
come desensitised to the violence they inict, it becomes an automatic response
to confrontation or perceived insult. Jankowski 1991 discusses a similar process
called deant individualism. He suggests that, as a result of scarce (physical
and emotional) resources, youths in poor neighbourhoods learn to become both
highly competitive and self-su¢ cient very early in their lives. Over time, this
leads them to engage in violence, as it makes them more likely to acquire larger
shares of available resources.
A common feature of violent coaching is engagement in juvenile crime (often
in a delinquent gang). Esbensen and Lynskey 2001 interviewed fourteen year-
old gang members in the United States. Of the respondents, twenty-ve per-
cent claimed to have shot at someone. Whilst much of this may be bravado, it
nevertheless indicates an acceptance of violence and an understanding of the im-
portance of signalling toughness. Similar (although less extreme) statistics were
reported by Esbensen and Weerman 2005 and Salagaev, Shashkin, Sherbakova,
and Touriyanskiy 2005 regarding Dutch and Russian juvenile gang members re-
spectively.
Violent coaching can take two forms; learning by doing and learning by ob-
serving. Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou 2010 interpret this in a network
setting. Youths learn by engaging in crime or by observing those to whom they
are connected. As expected, those with a higher degree of centrality within the
network acquire more skill. Bayer, Pinto¤, and Pozen 2004 provide empirical
evidence to back up this assertion with regard to network formation in juvenile
detention centres. This heterogeneity will play an important part in the analysis
to come.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I present
a model of organised crime in which a protection racket uses initiation to trade
60
Initiation and Protection Rackets The Model
o¤ reputational gains against fewer recruits. In section 2.4 I outline the equilibria
of the model. Section 2.5 considers intuitive conditions under which the Maa
can regulate its size and reputation through initiation. Section 2.6 discusses some
implications of the results, and section 2.7 concludes. Major proofs are left to
the appendices.
2.3 The Model
The model focuses on the territory of a neighbourhood protection racket known
as the Maa. The Maa recruits members from a measure N of youths who
live in the neighbourhood. These youths are heterogeneous in two respects; their
formal and criminal abilities. Formal ability can be high or low, i 2 fH;Lg, and
dictates the range of opportunities a youth has in the primary labour market. The
probability that a particular youth has high formal ability is given exogenously
by h. Criminal ability can take a range of values, i 2 [0; 1]. Youths with higher
criminal ability nd it less costly to acquire the skills required for a successful
criminal career. If youths have a lot of friends who are also engaging in juvenile
crime, they are able to learn from their friends mistakes. Conversely, if they
are relatively isolated they must engage in relatively costly trial and error. The
extent to which these two avenues are open to youths creates a large amount
of heterogeneity in criminal ability. i measures a youths centrality within a
delinquent network, and is distributed according to someG (). G is continuously
di¤erentiable, with density function g (), and has full support on [0; 1].
I allow for the possibility of correlation between formal and criminal abilities.
Some skills, such as basic numeracy, are equally important in both the primary
labour market and the market for protection. Others, such as a short temper, may
prove helpful when o¤ering protection, but would be detrimental to a successful
career in the legitimate economy. As such, I denote by G () the distribution of
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criminal abilities conditional on youthsformal ability. Whilst one might broadly
expect positive correlation, the results herein are equally valid if the relationship
were negative (or, indeed, if abilities are fully independent).
The focus of much of the economics of crime literature has been on the decision
to become involved in crime. Following this approach, I consider youthschoices.
Initially, they have the opportunity to engage in juvenile crime. Juvenile crime
is costly, but enables youths to acquire criminal skills. Thereafter, they choose
between a career in the primary labour market or in crime. If they opt for a
criminal career, I assume that they join the Maa.
Criminal skills can be thought of as an aptitude for inicting violence. A
youth with criminal ability i can acquire criminal skill ci by engaging in juvenile
crime at a cost J

ci
i

. J is increasing, convex and continuously di¤erentiable,
so the cost of acquiring criminal skill is increasing in the amount acquired, but
decreasing in criminal ability (reecting the fact that higher ability youths can
learn from observing others). For simplicity, I assume that J (0) = 0, so there
are no xed costs associated with criminal skills, and that J 0 (0) = 0 so acquiring
some criminal skill is almost always a¤ordable
Should youths then opt to work in the primary labour market, they receive
a wage that is commensurate with their formal ability. A high ability youth
earns wH whereas a low ability youth earns wL < wH . If, on the other hand,
they choose to become a criminal, the Maa makes use of their criminal skills. I
denote the set of recruits to the Maa by R, so i 2 R if and only if youth i joins
the Maa.
Before describing the payo¤ to a youth from joining the Maa, it is expedient
to discuss its operations in more detail. Since the Maa is a protection racket,
it relies on two features to generate revenue: its members, and its reputation for
violence. Protection customers pay the Maa to avoid encounters with violence.
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The amount they are willing to pay thus depends upon their beliefs about the
skills possessed by their protector. However, since maosi are unable to demon-
strate their violent tendencies to their customers (violence is not an equilibrium
outcome), the expected level of skill will be the same across all members. I call
this expected level of criminal skill, ct, the Maas reputation. By extension, each
member must generate the same revenue for the Maa:
r (Mt; ct) (2.1)
where Mt denotes the Maas size - the measure of its membership - reecting
possible network externalities (Sah 1991, Cook, Ludwig, Venkatesh, and Braga
2007) or congestion e¤ects. I assume that individual revenue has nite, positive
and diminishing marginal returns in both size and reputation. Moreover, a larger
Maa may be more able to take advantage of reputational gains, so rMc (Mt; ct) >
0. Since the Maa is already established, I endow it with initial size M0 and
reputation c0. Having recruited new members from the neighbourhood, its size
and reputation become:
M1 = (1  p)M0 + jRj (2.2)
c1 = (1  p) M0
M1
c0 +
jRj
M1
E [ci ji 2 R ] (2.3)
where p is the probability that current maosi are arrested, and jRj 2 [0; N ] is
the measure of youths whom the Maa recruits.
The Maas objective is to maximise r (Mt; ct). Many criminal organisations
are relatively loose collectives. As such, in order to maintain cohesion, it attempts
to maximise the payo¤ it can o¤er its members, subject to the wage bill not
exceeding its revenue. By increasing size, it will be able to generate more revenue.
However, as it will also have to pay more members, it may be the case that the
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payo¤ each member receive actually falls on average. Focusing on individual
revenue negates this.
Returning to youth payo¤s, recruits to the Maa undergo an initiation. Ini-
tiation serves several purposes. Firstly, by watching how tough the recruit nds
the process, it allows the Maa to observe the criminal skills of its recruits. Fur-
thermore, initiation is costly. It often involves the initiate engaging in a violent
activity during which they are at a disadvantage. By adjusting the di¢ culty
of the initiation, the Maa can provide an incentive to acquire criminal skills
(conditional on a youth still wishing to join). Finally, whilst the performance
of recruits may be di¢ cult for protection customers to observe, the di¢ culty
of initiation is often commonly known. Hence it acts as a signal to protection
customers regarding the Maas reputation. In terms of the model, the Maa
publicly announces its initiation di¢ culty, I  0. Youth i 2 R su¤er disutility
I
ci
from undergoing initiation, reecting the fact that more di¢ cult initiation is
more costly, but more skilled recruits su¤er less. Note that I = 0 is equivalent to
no initiation, as all recruits nd initiation equally straightforward. In this case,
the Maa is unable to di¤erentiate between di¤erent skill levels, and must treat
all recruits homogeneously. The Maa chooses initiation di¢ culty to maximise
the revenue each member is able to generate.
Having undergone initiation, maosi are paid according to:

u+ (1  u) ~ci
c1

r (M1; c1) (2.4)
where u 2 [0; 1] is xed and ~ci is the level of criminal skill the gang believes youth
i to possess. Irrespective of the value of u, (2.4) satises budget balance so the
organisations wage bill is equal to its total revenue. The form of contract o¤ered
by the Maa nests several examples by Chang, Lu, and Chen 2005. If u = 1, all
Maa members receive identical wages. Chang et al dub this a uniform sharing
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scheme. Such a scheme attracts a large number of youths to the Maa, but causes
them to acquire relatively low levels of criminal skill3. If u = 0 (and ability-
adherent sharing scheme) maosi receive wages commensurate with the level of
skills they have acquired. Whilst this solves the low skill levels, the budget
constraint creates an externality. By acquiring more skills, a recruit improves
both the Maas reputation and their own standing within the organisations
hierarchy. Since individual revenue su¤ers from diminishing marginal returns,
this reduces the payo¤ to other maosi. In turn, ability adherence could lead to
a fall in the Maas size.
In summary, the payo¤ from joining the Maa is:
  I
ci
+

u+ (1  u) ~ci
c1

r (M1; c1) (2.5)
A youth is career decision is denoted ji 2 f0; 1g, taking unitary value if and
only if they decide to join the Maa.
The timing is as follows. Firstly, the Maa (whose initial size and reputation
are common knowledge) publicly announce an initiation di¢ culty. Youths pri-
vately learn their formal and criminal abilities, and decide how much criminal
skill to acquire. They then decide upon a career. Protection customers update
their beliefs about the Maas reputation, and all maosi (including recruits)
generate revenue for the organisation. Finally, the Maa shares out its earnings
according to (2.4).
2.4 Equilibrium
This model supports several perfect Bayesian equilibria, consisting of:
1. An initiation di¢ culty, I  0, that maximises the revenue each maoso is
3As their model does not incorporate initiation, it leads to pure free-riding.
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able to generate, and Maa beliefs, eci, about each recruits criminal skill,
given the Maas initial size and reputation.
2. Criminal skill, ci , and career decisions, j

i , for every youth, given the Maas
initiation di¢ culty, initial size and reputation.
3. An updated reputation, c1, based upon customersbeliefs about the dis-
tribution of criminal skill within the Maa, given the Maas initiation
di¢ culty, initial size and reputation.
I focus on symmetric equilibria. In order to discuss youthsdecisions, it is
important to distinguish between the case where the Maa employs an initiation
and the case where it does not. In the former situation, the organisation learns
precisely the level of criminal skill each youth has acquired. In the latter, it does
not.
2.4.1 Youth Decisions with Initiation
Let us begin by assuming that I > 0. In this setting eci = ci, as the Maa know
I and observe   I
ci
. A youth with ability prole (i; i) faces the following utility
maximisation problem:
max
ci0;ji2f0;1g

(1  ji)wi + ji

  I
ci
+

u+ (1  u) ci
c1

r (M1; c1)

  J

ci
i

(2.6)
Suppose that ji = 0, so youth i seeks employment in the primary labour
market. Criminal skills are of no use in their career. However, there is still a cost
associated with acquiring them. Consequently, youth i chooses to avoid juvenile
crime, selecting ci = 0. Conversely, if ji = 1, the youth gains a great deal from
acquiring criminal skill. Not only do they nd the initiation less challenging, but
they also receive greater remuneration upon successfully joining the Maa. They
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choose ci  c (i; I) to satisfy:
I
ci
+ (1  u) c

i
c1
r (M1; c1)  c

i
i
J 0

ci
i

(2.7)
The marginal benet to acquiring criminal skills is increasing in both the di¢ -
culty of initiation and the size of the Maa. A larger Maa increases the revenue
that each youth generates, increasing the size of the bounty to be shared amongst
the maosi. On the other hand, a tougher reputation actually reduces the mar-
ginal benet of criminal skill acquisition. Acquiring additional criminal skill does
relatively little to improve a recruits standing within the Maas hierarchy, as
competition is sti¤er.
Clearly, any increase in recruits criminal skills will lead to an increase in
the Maas reputation. This creates an externality, which will prove important
in determining whether initiation is an e¤ective method for controlling youths
incentives. By acquiring more criminal skill, a recruit e¤ectively claims a larger
share of the Maas bounty, at the expense of their fellow members. This reduces
youthsincentive to join the Maa in the rst place.
Turning attention to career decisions, a youth i will become a recruit to the
Maa if and only if they satisfy the following participation constraint:
  I
ci
+

u+ (1  u) c

i
c1

r (M1; c1)  J

ci
i

 wi (2.8)
The left hand side is strictly increasing in the criminal ability of the youth. Con-
sider two youths i and j, with i < j. If both youths were to acquire the same
level of criminal skill, they would su¤er the same disutility from initiation and
receive the same earnings upon joining the Maa. However, acquiring criminal
skill is easier for youth j, so their overall payo¤ from Maa membership must be
strictly higher.
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On the other hand, the payo¤ from joining the primary labour market is
independent of criminal ability. Hence we can say that, if a particular youth
joins the Maa, all youths with the same formal ability and higher criminal
ability also join the Maa. In other words:
Lemma 1 For any initial Maa size and reputation, any initiation di¢ culty,
and for each  2 fH;Lg, there exists  2 (0; 1] such that:
i 2 R () i =  and i  
For each i 2 fH;Lg I call the youth with ability prole (i; i) the marginal
youth. Since the Maa initiate its members,  > 0. A youth with no criminal
ability nds it prohibitively costly to acquire criminal skill. Without criminal
skills, they nd initiation unbearable, and will never join. Assuming that a
positive measure of youths with both formal abilities join the Maa, the identity
of the marginal youth is given by the participation constraint (2.8) binding. They
are exactly indi¤erent between joining the primary labour market and being
recruited to the Maa. Clearly, any decrease in the payo¤ from being recruited
(caused by, say, an increase in initiation di¢ culty) will cause the abilities of the
marginal youths to increase.
Finally, we can turn attention to the resulting Maa size and reputation:
M1 = (1  p)M0 +Nh (1 GH (H)) +N (1  h) (1 GL (L)) (2.9)
and:
c1 = (1  p) M0
M1
c0+
N
M0

h
Z 1
=H
c (; I) dGH () + (1  h)
Z 1
=L
c (; I) dGL ()

(2.10)
Given that I is common knowledge, the Maas customers are able to infer both
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the abilities of the marginal youths, and the amount of criminal skill acquired by
any youth of a given criminal ability. However, without knowledge of the ability
prole of any particular youth, they cannot determine the criminal skill of the
particular maoso who asks them to pay their protection money.
These strategies admit up to three partial equilibria, displayed by Figure
2.2. Heuristically, suppose that both high and low formal ability youths become
recruits. The Maa is large. Moreover, since recruits with high formal ability will
also have relatively high criminal ability, the Maas reputation is strong. Each
maoso generates a lot of revenue, and the payo¤ to all members is relatively
high. This makes joining the Maa worthwhile for high formal ability youths,
supporting the equilibrium (0 < H&LL < 
H&L
H < 1).
Secondly, suppose that only low formal ability youths become recruits. The
Maa is smaller than before, and there is a relatively high proportion of lower
criminal ability recruits. As a result, each maoso generates less revenue, and the
payo¤ from joining the Maa is lower than in the previous case. Whilst it is still
worthwhile joining the Maa for those with a low outside option (LL < 1), those
with high formal ability nd it more appealing to work in the primary labour
market (LH = 1).
Finally, suppose neither low nor high formal ability youths choose to join the
Maa. The organisations size falls dramatically. Reputation is unchanged at c0.
The payo¤ from joining the Maa may be even lower than before. As such, both
high and low formal ability youths nd it more worthwhile to join the primary
labour market (NL = 
N
H = 1).
2.4.2 Youth Decisions without Initiation
If I = 0, the Maas beliefs about a youths criminal skill are independent of the
youths ability, eci = ec. A youth with ability prole (i; i) faces the following
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Figure 2.2: Equilibria with high and low recruits, only low recruits and no re-
cruits.
utility maximisation problem:
max
ci0;ji2f0;1g

(1  ji)wi + ji

u+ (1  u) ec
c1

r (M1; c1)

  J

ci
i

(2.11)
As before, if the youth joins the primary labour market, criminal skills are of
no use to them. As criminal skills are costly, youths do not acquire any. Suppose
they decide to join the Maa instead. Without an initiation ritual, the Maa is
unable to observe their skills. This creates a strict incentive to free-ride on others
criminal skills. Once again, they choose not to acquire any, ci = 0. Knowing
this, the Maa sets ec = 0, and customers set:
c1 = (1  p) M0
M1
c0 (2.12)
A youth with ability prole (i; i) will therefore join the Maa if and only if:
ur (M1; c1)  wi (2.13)
Since both payo¤s are independent of the criminal ability of the youth, we
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have that:
Lemma 2 For any initial Maa size and reputation, and for each  2 fH;Lg,
if I = 0 then there exists  2 f0; 1g such that:
i 2 R () i =  and i  
In this case, either all youths of a particular formal ability have a strict in-
centive to join the Maa, or none do. Combined with the youthscriminal skill
decisions, we have:
M1 = (1  p)M0 +Nh (1 GH (H)) +N (1  h) (1 GL (L)) (2.14)
Once again, this admits up to three partial equilibria. If
ur

(1  p)M0 +N; (1  p) M0
M1
c0

 wH (2.15)
then there exists an equilibrium in which all youths join the Maa (H&LH =
H&LL = 0). The organisation is large, buts its reputation is relatively diluted.
Recruits make up a large proportion of members, and none of them have acquired
criminal skills. Nevertheless, even high formal ability youths receive a strictly
higher payo¤ from joining a large Maa.
If:
wL  ur

(1  p)M0 +N (1  h) ; (1  p) M0
M1
c0

 wH (2.16)
then there exists an equilibrium in which only youths will low formal ability join
the Maa (LH = 1, 
L
L = 0). A smaller Maa is less able to generate revenue
through protection. However, its reputation is less diluted, as there are fewer
maosi with no criminal skills. Even so, the payo¤ to each member is lower, and
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only low formal ability youths nd it protable to join. Finally, if:
ur ((1  p)M0; c0)  wL (2.17)
then there exists an equilibrium in which nobody joins the Maa (NH = 
N
L = 1).
The Maa is too small to generate enough revenue to be able to attract new
members, despite having the strongest reputation of any of the equilibria.
2.4.3 Maa Decisions
The Maa chooses initiation di¢ culty to maximise the revenue each member is
able to generate:
I 2 arg max
I0
fr (M1; c1)g (2.18)
The choice over whether to initiate recruits is not trivial. It knows that, in any
equilibrium, if it does not initiate then recruits will not acquire criminal skills.
However, it will attract the maximum number of recruits available to it in that
equilibrium. Consequently, if the Maa is small and has a good reputation, then
it may nd it protable not to initiate. In particular, the revenue each member
generates is discontinuous around I = 0. Without initiation, each individual
generates:
r
fM1; (1  p) M0fM1 c0

(2.19)
where fM1 depends upon the equilibrium. Conversely, as I ! 0+, the Maa can
still distinguish between youths. As such, recruits will acquire:
c (i)  i (J 0) 1

i (1  u) r (M1; c1)
c1

> 0 (2.20)
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Moreover, for each i 2 fH;Lg there exists i > 0 such that: 
u+ (1  u) c
 
i

c1
!
r (M1; c1)  J
 
c
 
i

i
!
= wi (2.21)
and youths will only join if i =  and i  . The Maa will be strictly smaller,
but with a better reputation. Assuming that the Maa does choose to initiate
its recruits, in each equilibrium it will choose an initiation di¢ culty satisfying:
@r
@M1
@r
@c1
=  
@M1
@I
@c1
@I
(2.22)
This choice of di¢ culty optimally balances increases in revenue through rep-
utational gains against lost revenue resulting from fewer maosi. Letting the
resulting reputation and Maa size be c1 and M

1 respectively, the Maa will
choose to initiate its recruits if and only if:
r
fM1; (1  p) M0fM1 c0

 r (M1 ; c1) (2.23)
namely when the reputational gains from initiation are su¢ cient to o¤set the
loss of members. Since revenue su¤ers from diminishing marginal returns to
both size and reputation, the Maa will only forego initiation if it already has a
strong reputation and relatively few members.
2.5 Initiation as a Signal
If the Maa is to utilise initiation, it must be able to control its size and reputation
by varying its di¢ culty. Increasing di¢ culty has two direct e¤ects. Firstly, it
reduces the payo¤to each youth from becoming maosi. The disutility they su¤er
from undergoing initiation is greater. Those towards the bottom of the criminal
ability distribution su¤er the most, as they acquire relatively few criminal skills.
73
Initiation and Protection Rackets Initiation as a Signal
As such, these individuals switch away from a criminal career towards the primary
labour market. The abilities of the marginal youths increase, and the Maas size
shrinks.
Secondly, the marginal benet of acquiring criminal skills increases. Since
recruits su¤er greater disutility when they undertake initiation, they choose to
o¤set this by acquiring more criminal skill. They opt to su¤er more by engaging in
more intense juvenile crime in order to be in better shape for initiation. In turn,
this improves the Maas reputation. Since all recruits acquire more criminal
skill, increased initiation di¢ culty has relatively little direct e¤ect upon their
relative standing within the Maas hierarchy.
There are, however, additional endogenous e¤ects. When the Maas size
falls, it is those with relatively low levels of criminal skill who leave. This fur-
ther increases the average criminal skill in the Maa, and its reputation improves
again. Moreover, with fewer members, each maosos standing within the hier-
archy falls. In turn, this reduces their payo¤ from joining the Maa, since the
organisation operates with a certain amount of ability adherence. More youths
opt for the primary labour market.
Initiation is therefore e¤ective, insofar as if it causes an increase in reputation,
it also causes a decline in recruits of both formal criminal abilities and vice-versa:
Proposition 6 Consider the e¤ect of increasing initiation di¢ culty in any equi-
librium of the initiation model. Then:
@c1
@I
> 0 () @H
@I
> 0 and
@L
@I
> 0 (2.24)
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.
As noted above, improvements in reputation cause an endogenous increase
in the abilities of the marginal youths. The converse is simply a result of the
optimisation behaviour of the Maa. If the abilities of the marginal youths are
74
Initiation and Protection Rackets Initiation as a Signal
increasing in initiation di¢ culty, the Maas size must be declining. For initiation
to be worthwhile, it must be the case that there are reputational gains associated
with initiation. Otherwise, the Maa could strictly improve the payo¤ to its
members by reducing initiation di¢ culty.
The endogenous e¤ects could be the source of instability within the Maa,
precluding its use of initiation. When initiation di¢ culty increases, youths at the
bottom of the hierarchy su¤er most, opting instead for a career in the primary
labour market. This, combined with an initial increase in the criminal skills
acquired by remaining maosi, improves the Maas reputation.
The improvement in reputation reduces the ability-adherent payo¤ to the re-
maining maosi. As the Maa has a stronger reputation, each maoso sees their
relative standing with the hierarchy decline. There is simply more intense com-
petition over the organisations income. Those who now nd themselves towards
the bottom of the hierarchy nd that they are receiving a smaller income than
previously. They therefore opt to join the primary labour market. There is a
further decline in low skilled maosi, and the reputation improves further. Con-
currently, the marginal benet to acquiring criminal skills declines. When faced
with sti¤er competition, a relatively large increase in criminal skill is required
to secure a modest improvement in a maosos standing. This partially o¤sets
the endogenous reputational gain, but is not su¢ cient to cause an endogenous
reduction.
The endogenous reputational gain causes further declines in Maa size which,
in turn, leads to further reputational gains. Under certain circumstances, this
process could continue until the Maa has a very strong reputation but (almost)
no members. In this sense, the criminal organisation is relatively unstable. It
cannot use initiation di¢ culty to control its reputation and size because the
endogenous e¤ects dominate. It is therefore unable to take advantage of this
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important signalling opportunity.
The following condition ensures that the use of initiation is stable, in the sense
that it leads to a nite increase in reputation, and associated decline in Maa
size.
Proposition 7 Consider any equilibrium of the initiation model. There exists
 > 0 such that if, for each  2 fH;Lg, the hazard rate of the conditional
distribution of criminal abilities is su¢ ciently bounded:
g ()
1 G ()   (2.25)
then the Maa is stable.
Proof. See Appendix 2.B.
A bounded hazard rate suggests that the conditional distribution of criminal
abilities is severely skewed. The vast majority of youths of any formal ability
have relatively low criminal abilities. Moreover, the density of the distribution
is rapidly declining. When the Maa increases the di¢ culty of its initiation,
the organisation will see a relatively large initial decline in size, and associated
improvement in reputation. A relatively large proportion of recruits have abilities
equal to, or very close to, that of the marginal youths. Consequently, a small
increase in the abilities of the marginal youths will result in a relatively large
measure of youths opting for a career in the primary labour market. Combined
with the increase in the criminal skills acquired by those who remain committed
to becoming maosi, the reputational gains are substantial.
However, as the endogenous e¤ects begin to operate, each incremental in-
crease in the abilities of the marginal youths results in a smaller and smaller
measure of youths switching to careers in the primary labour market. As such,
whilst the Maa still lose recruits towards the bottom of its skills distribution,
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each resulting incremental gain in reputation is smaller. Combined with the en-
dogenous decline in criminal skills resulting for increased competition over the
organisations bounty, the Maas reputation converges to a new, nite, level.
Similarly, the organisations size declines. The Maa reaches point where its rep-
utation and size have converged, and initiation has been successful in signalling
both size and the distribution of criminal skills.
The implications of Proposition 7 can be shown diagrammatically in the equi-
librium with initiation in which only youths with low formal ability join the Maa.
First, consider Figure 2.3. Suppose that there is a small increase in initiation dif-
culty. The expected cost of joining the Maa increases, a¤ecting the ability of
the marginal youth, as shown by point A. Similarly, since youths acquire more
criminal skills, the immediate impact on the Maas reputation is given by B.
With the increase in reputation, each maosos standing in the organisation falls,
reducing their ability adherent payo¤. The ability of the marginal youth increases
endogenously, given by C. Since those with relatively low levels of criminal skill
no longer join the Maa, its reputation further improves, shown by D. This leads
to a further loss of members (point E), and the process continues. If Proposition
7 holds, as is the case in the diagram, the size of each endogenous increase in
the responsiveness of the Maas reputation and ability of the marginal youth
declines, until eventually they converge to
 
@c1
@I

and
 
@L
@I

respectively.
Now consider a situation in which Proposition 7 does not hold. Initiation
may not be stable, as shown in Figure 2.4. As before, the exogenous impact
of an increase in initiation on the ability of the marginal youth and the Maas
reputation are given by A and B respectively. As before, we can trace the en-
dogenous e¤ect of an improvement in the Maas reputation upon the ability of
the marginal youth as a movement from B to C. Subsequent endogenous e¤ects
take us to D, then to E etc. However, in this case, the distribution of crimi-
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Figure 2.3: A situation in which Proposition 7 holds.
nal abilities is such that the endogenous e¤ects actually increase in magnitude.
Rather than converging to nite impacts, @c1
@I
and @L
@I
increase towards innity.
Any small increase in the initiation di¢ culty the Maa prescribe to its recruits
could potentially leads to a complete collapse in membership.
2.6 Discussion
The results from the previous section suggest that protection rackets are likely to
thrive in neighbourhoods with extremely skewed distributions of criminal abili-
ties. In such areas, initiation di¢ culty act as a su¢ cient statistic for the distribu-
tion of criminal skills within the racket. By publicising changes in the di¢ culty of
initiation that the Maas recruits undertake, customers can easily update their
beliefs about the value of the protection on o¤er and consequently adjust their
willingness to pay for such services.
There is evidence to suggest that protection rackets do indeed operate in
such areas. Recruits with higher criminal abilities acquire more criminal skill,
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Figure 2.4: A situation in which Proposition 7 does not hold.
and those with more criminal skill have a higher rank in the organisation. As
such, a bounded hazard rate would suggest that the vast majority of organised
criminals would receive a low wage. Moreover, relatively few members would
have higher ability, resulting in dramatically higher wages. This is precisely the
distribution of wages found by Levitt and Venkatesh 2000. The foot soldiers they
studied in a Chicago gang earned a at rate of around $2,400 per annum. This
suggests that they all have fairly similar, low criminal ability (certainly compared
to a gang leader, who could earn in excess of $200,000 per annum).
This result lends further support to the use of key player policies (Ballester,
Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou 2004 and 2010). These policies seek to identify those
individuals who play an integral part within a criminal network. They could be
individuals who interact with a lot of other members, or they could act as couriers
between otherwise independent groups (Liu, Patacchini, Zenou, and Lee 2011).
By apprehending them, law enforcers make criminal interactions more di¢ cult,
thus disrupting the wider organisation.
In the model presented here, these individuals are towards the top of the
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criminal ability distribution. By removing them, law enforcers change the dis-
tribution of criminal ability (and hence criminal skill) within the Maa in two
ways (Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou 2004). Firstly, there is the direct
e¤ect of removing the individuals from the network, reducing the domain of the
resulting distribution of criminal abilities. In particular, suppose that all those
with criminal ability greater that e are removed. The resulting hazard rate of
the conditional distribution of criminal abilities is:
g ()
G (e) G () (2.26)
Since G (e) < 1, clearly this is larger than before. As such, it is less likely that
the Maa will be able to e¤ectively signal their size and propensity for violence
through initiation. However, removing all those at the top of the distribution
has a countervailing e¤ect. It leads to an immediate reduction in the Maas
reputation. In e¤ect, this increases the required upper bound on the hazard rate,
, as the standing of all members in the resulting organisation is improved.
The second avenue through which key player policies operate involves reduc-
ing the abilities of all remaining youths. By removing some of the most connected
youths in the juvenile network, law enforcers also remove other youthsability
to interact with, and learn from, these individuals. As a result, each remaining
youth has to rely more heavily upon learning by doing. This increases the pro-
portion of maosi with relatively low ability. Once again, this makes it less likely
that the Maa will be able to use initiation to control its reputation. If it were to
attempt to increase initiation di¢ culty, a larger proportion of potential recruits
would switch to employment in the primary labour market. As a result, the
Maas reputation improves more than it would have done previously. This trig-
gers an endogenous increase in the abilities of the marginal youths. Since every
ability has a higher weighting than previously, the reputational gain causes a
80
Initiation and Protection Rackets Conclusions
larger proportional fall in membership. In turn, this causes a greater endogenous
reputational gain. Once again, the hazard rates are likely to be increased. How-
ever, unlike the direct removal of those at the top end of the abilities distribution,
this second avenue has no incremental e¤ect on the upper bound.
Targeting foot soldiers, or those on the periphery of the Maa will have the
opposite e¤ect. Apprehending them reduces the proportion of the group who have
relatively low criminal ability. As a result, when initiation di¢ culty increases,
the Maas reputation converges to a higher level more rapidly. Each endogenous
increase in the abilities of the marginal youths results in a relatively few recruits
opting for a career in the primary labour market. The subsequent reputational
gain is therefore relatively modest.
2.7 Conclusions
Criminal organisations inict a large cost upon society. Many organisations start
out as protection rackets, where a reputation for violence is necessary and suf-
cient to operate. They become a Maa. With relatively few opportunities to
signal an aptitude for violence, many Maas utilise initiation rituals. Whilst all
recruits nd these costly, those who have engaged in juvenile crime have acquired
su¢ cient skills to make undertaking them worthwhile. A di¢ cult initiation thus
attracts relatively few, highly capable, recruits. Customers update their beliefs
about the skills maosi possess, and are consequently willing to pay more for
protection services.
When the Maa adjusts its initiation di¢ culty, recruits acquire more criminal
skills. Concurrently, recruits with relatively low levels of criminal skills opt to
join the primary labour market instead. Both e¤ects lead to improvements in the
Maas reputation. Since the average skill level within the organisation is higher,
each individuals relative skill level (and hence their standing within the organisa-
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tions hierarchy) declines. This leads more recruits to leave, and results in further
endogenous improvements in reputation. If the hazard rate of the distribution
of underlying criminal abilities is su¢ ciently bounded, these endogenous declines
in the size of the organisation (and the associated reputational gains) are small
enough to enable the Maa to use initiation di¢ culty to optimally control the
reputation versus size trade o¤.
This result has implications for policy. In particular, it provides further weight
to the notion that law enforcers should target key players within criminal organ-
isations. By doing so, the distribution of criminal abilities is altered, placing
greater weight upon those with relatively low abilities. The hazard rate may in-
crease as a result, increasing the endogenous e¤ects to the point that changes in
initiation di¢ culty result in a terminal decline in the size of the organisation. As
such, this approach not only reduces the Maas ability to interact, but may also
deprive it of one of the most common approaches to advertising their reputation
for violence.
Conversely, those policies which focus on the organisations foot soldiers may
partially backre. In contrast to key player policies, this approach adjusts the
distribution to place greater weight on those with relatively high ability. This
reduces the endogenous e¤ects, causing the organisations reputation to converge
more rapidly. This makes it easier for the racket to vary its size and reputation
through changing initiation di¢ culty.
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2.A Proof of Proposition 6
The proof that follows is for an equilibrium in which both high and low formal
ability youths join the maa. The proof for the case in which only low formal
ability youths become maosi is similar, and therefore omitted. We have two
statements to prove. Considering each in turn:
2.A.1 @c1@I > 0) @H@I > 0 and @L@I > 0
For each given formal ability, the marginal youth is dened by:
  I
c
+
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

c1
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r (M1; c1)  J

c


= w
where c  c (; I). Taking rst order conditions with respect to I and applying
the envelope theorem:
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Since the gang seeks to maximise the revenue each member is able to generate
rM
@M1
@I
+ rc
@c1
@I
 0. So, if @c1
@I
> 0 then @
@I
> 0, as required.
2.A.2 @H@I > 0 and
@L
@I > 0) @c1@I > 0
We have that:
rM
@M1
@I
=  rc@c1
@I
with rM > 0 and rc > 0. So @c1@I > 0 if and only if
@M1
@I
< 0. Now:
@M1
@I
=  NhgH (H) @H
@I
 N (1  h) gL (L) @L
@I
Since g () > 0 for all  2 fH;Lg and  2 [0; 1], if @H@I > 0 and @L@I > 0 then
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@M1
@I
< 0 as required.
This completes the proof. 
2.B Proof of Proposition 7
Once again, the proof that follows is for an equilibrium in which both high and
low formal ability youths join the maa. The proof for the case in which only
low formal ability youths become maosi is similar, and therefore omitted.
We have that:
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A su¢ cient condition for @c1
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> 0 is that, for each  2 fH;Lg, we have:
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In order to show that the boundedness of the hazard function is su¢ cient for this
to be true, it is necessary to prove some intermediate results.
Lemma 3 For all I > 0, the optimal criminal skills of all recruits, i, is bounded:
0 < c  ci  bc
Proof. For a youth with criminal ability i, the marginal benet of acquiring
criminal skill is bounded below:
I
c2i
+ (1  u) r (M1; c1)
c1
> (1  u) r (M1; c1)
c1
Given the marginal cost of criminal skill, we have that:
c (i; I)  i (J 0) 1

i (1  u) r (M1; c1)
c1

 c
Now, individual revenue is also bounded above: r (M1; c1)  b0 2 R+. Also,
for each M1,
r(M1;c1)
c1
is bounded above by assumption. Moreover, since M1 2
[(1  p)M0; (1  p)M0 +N ], there exists b1 2 R+ such that r(M1;c1)c1  b1. The
payment the gang o¤ers is thus bounded above by a straight line:

u+ (1  u) c

i
c1

r (M1; c1)  ub0 + (1  u) b1ci
The total cost of joining the gang, on the other hand is bounded below by an
increasing, convex function. Since i 2 [0; 1]:
J

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
+
I
ci
 J (ci )
85
Initiation and Protection Rackets Proof of Proposition 7
So, there exists c^ 2 R+ satisfying:
ub0 + (1  u) b1c^ = J (c^)
such that, for all ci  c^, the payo¤ to a youth from joining the gang is negative.
Thus, no youth would choose would optimally choose ci  c^. This completes the
proof.
An implication of the lemma is that the reputation of the gang is also bounded
above:
c1  c0 + c^
Similarly, there is an upper bound on the initiation di¢ culty the gang will
set. Since the gang pays at most ub0 + (1  u) b1ci , and the minimum disutility
caused by initiation is   I
c^
, nobody will choose to join the gang in any equilibrium
if:
I  I^  c^ (ub0 + (1  u) b1c^)
thus setting an initiation di¢ culty above I^ is never worthwhile for the gang.
The second intermediate result is as follows:
Lemma 4 For all I > 0, the identity of the marginal youth with lower formal
ability, L, is bounded above zero:
L   > 0
Proof. For su¢ ciently low criminal ability, the payo¤ from joining the gang
is negative for all ci  0. Consequently, for su¢ ciently small i   the youth
would never join the gang.
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Given these results, a su¢ cient condition for @c
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> 0 is:
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completes the proof. 
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Chapter 3
Recruitment to Organised Crime
3.1 Introduction
Over recent years, a myriad of policies have been suggested to tackle youth in-
volvement in crime. The reason for this is simple: crime inicts a cost upon soci-
ety. Recent estimates (Cohen and Piquero 2009) place the average present value
to society of saving one high-risk eighteen year-old from a life of crime between
$2.6 million and $5.3 million. This includes between £ 675,000 and $1 million in
lost productivity. Over the last decade, estimates of these costs have increased
substantially. In an earlier study employing a similar approach (Cohen 1998), the
headline cost was between $1.7 million and $2.3 million, with lost productivity
accounting for around £ 155,000. Admittedly, a large proportion of the increase
is the result of improvements in measurement techniques. Nevertheless, crime is
much more costly than hitherto imagined. The individual involved su¤ers from
foregone education, likely drug use, and potential punishment. Wider society is
forced to invest in security, pay for public prosecution and incarceration, and suf-
fer from victimisation and the fear of crime. The recent intensication of research
into these policies is therefore unsurprising.
All of the policies put forward are based upon the same argument: increasing
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the opportunity cost of crime reduces its amount and intensity. In turn, this re-
duces the social cost of crime. Broadly speaking, this appears sound. However, in
one special case - that of organised crime - it may fail. Criminal organisations are
proactive. They are more able to able to adapt to changes in their environment.
They can respond to new policies, counteracting their e¤ects by adjusting their
inputs and the wages they o¤er. Under certain conditions, discussed herein, the
social cost of crime may even increase.
How large is the problem? Wage data from a Chicago gang (Levitt and
Venkatesh 2000) suggest that the cost of youths joining criminal organisations
may be towards the top end of Cohen and Piqueros estimates. They report
that the gang studied valued the lives of its members at somewhere between
$8,000 and $500,000. Even the upper estimate is only 10% of the average value
of a human life in the literature, suggesting an average loss to society of around
$4.5 million. A recent survey (Egley and Howell 2011) estimated that there are
28,100 gangs active in the US, employing some 731,000 individuals. Combined
with Cohen and Piqueros estimates, the annual cost of youth involvement in
organised crime may be as high as $465 billion in the US, or 3% of US GDP
(Bureau of Economic Analysis 2011)1.
This paper develops a simple framework in which to study a criminal organ-
isations likely reaction to the implementation of policy. A prot-maximising
gang has two available inputs, labour and violence, which it uses generate rev-
enue through a range of activities, from prostitution and drug dealing, to people
tra¢ cking and protection. Heterogeneous youths grow up in the gangs neigh-
bourhood. During their early years, they have the opportunity to acquire crim-
inal skills. They then decide where to seek employment. If they join the formal
economy, they are paid a at wage. If instead they opt for a criminal career,
1Cohen and Piquero use a constant 2% discount rate. Authors estimates are based upon
youths being active from age 18 to 26 and use 2009 US nominal GDP.
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they join the neighbourhood gang. By joining the gang, they are required to
inict violence. The exact amount of violence, and the form of compensation
provided, depends upon the gangs ability to discriminate between youths with
di¤erent abilities. At its most basic, the gang will o¤er a at wage, and require
all youths to inict the same amount of violence. A discriminating gang, on the
other hand, may o¤er a range of di¤erent wages, each associated with a di¤erent
level of violence.
When a policy is introduced that a¤ects the youths incentives, the gangs
reaction depends upon how variation of inputs a¤ect prots. If violence and size
are complementary in the prot function, any policy that aims to reduce the
incentive to join the gang also reduces the amount of violence the gang employs,
unequivocally lowering the social loss from crime. If, on the other hand, violence
and size are prot substitutes, a variety of outcomes may arise. Falling size may
cause the gang to substitute towards violence (in a similar manner to Poutvaara
and Priks 2009 and 2011) or vice versa. Perversely, this could increase the social
cost of crime. Policies are therefore most e¤ective when they not only reduce
gang membership, but also hamper the gangs ability to intensify violence. For
example, prevention of juvenile crime may prove particularly e¤ective. It not only
increases the opportunity cost of crime, but also reduces youthsability to learn
criminal skills. Conversely, improving labour market conditions, conditional on a
youth still choosing to become a criminal, have no impact upon their incentives to
learn criminal skills. Whilst membership is reduced, such policies unambiguously
increases the marginal protability of violence, causing the gang to intensify its
activities.
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3.1.1 Criminal Organisations as Firms
Two approaches are often employed when considering the activities of organised
crime, reecting two di¤erent literatures. Those considering the origins of crim-
inal organisations (for example Gambetta 1996, Skaperdas and Syropoulos 1997
or Dixit 2007) think of them as pseudo-states, lling the void left by weak law
enforcement. This literature views a local monopoly over violence as the den-
ing characteristics of organised crime. Conversely, it is through the lens of a
prot-maximising rm that established criminal organisations are most success-
fully analysed (for example Garoupa 2000, Chang, Lu, and Chen 2005 or Kugler,
Verdier, and Zenou 2005). This paper adopts the second approach, whilst incor-
porating elements of the rst.
Some tailoring of the standard theory of the rm apparatus is necessary.
Criminal organisations are not regular rms; their property rights are not pro-
tected by statute; nor are their activities constrained by it. Moreover, their
activities are under constant (violent) threat from law enforcement agencies, as
well as competitors. As such, their factors of production are slightly di¤erent.
The economic and criminological literatures point to two inputs being common
to all avours of criminal organisation: number of members and violence.
As with all rms, labour is critical for criminal organisations. In addition
to its traditional role in production (Chang, Lu, and Chen 2005), there are sev-
eral economies of scale that a larger organisation is able to take advantage of.
Transactions within illegal markets are fraught with risk. Trading partners are
prone to cheating one another. There is a constant threat from undercover police
o¢ cers. These risks lead to a reduction in trade (Cook, Ludwig, Venkatesh, and
Braga 2007) giving rise to the usual ine¢ ciencies (from the criminal organisa-
tions perspective, at least). Large criminal organisations can internalise a lot of
these transactions. By vouching for its members, and inicting severe punish-
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ments on those who renege, a criminal organisation enables individuals to trade
with one another in safety. Membership acts as a guarantee. They also make it
harder for police to inltrate them by being more self-su¢ cient.
Sah 1991 notes that larger criminal organisations can also stretch police re-
sources. As the number of members increases, the probability than any one in-
dividual will be arrested may diminish. Consequently, larger organisations su¤er
proportionally less from police disruption.
Violence is the other key component of criminal enterprises. At rst pass, the
reasons seem obvious. Firms operating a protection racket must be willing and
able to use violence against those who disrupt their clientsbusinesses (Gambetta
1996, Dixit 2007). As protection often evolves into extortion, violence may also
be required to ensure that clients continue to pay their fees (Garoupa 2000).
Violence (more frequently, the threat of violence) can thus be seen as a direct
input into the criminal organisations production function.
Violence is equally important as a mechanism for reducing disruption to the
organisations other operations. As it is impossible for the organisation to operate
in isolation, numerous stakeholders will, over time, gain information that could
implicate it in various illegal activities. Violence is used to ensure that the cost
of informing the police is prohibitively high.
Of these stakeholders, the ones with the greatest potential to harm the organi-
sation are its members. Baccara and Bar-Isaac 2008 consider the problem of infor-
mation di¤usion within a network design framework. Where the threat of violence
is credible, and su¢ cient to prevent members implicating the organisation, a hi-
erarchical structure proves to be optimal. Information is passed throughout the
organisation e¢ ciently. Organisations, such as terrorist groups, who cannot rely
on their members not to share information, are forced into a much less e¢ cient
cell structure. The use of extreme violence against members-turned-informants
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is well documented, particularly with regard to the Italian Maas code of se-
crecy; the omertà (see, for example, Gambetta 1996, Paoli 2003, Raab 2006).
Similarly, violence may be employed to prevent residents of the organisations
territory (where its activities are profuse) from interfering, or cooperating with
law enforcers.
Finally, criminal organisations use violence to protect their local monopolies
from competitors. Silverman 2004 provides a relevant economic analysis, ad-
mittedly in a broader economics of crime context. He shows that there is an
incentive for individuals to develop a reputation for violence, even if they are
not inherently violent. By doing so, only those with a genuine predilection for
violence will stand up to them. Similarly, criminal organisations may develop a
reputation for violence to deter rivals.
Employing these inputs, criminal organisationsoutput is varied. They tend
to be active in a variety of markets, from drugs and prostitution to protection and
smuggling. Irrespective of which market(s) the organisation is operating in, size
and violence are revenue complements. Members of more violent groups su¤er
less disruption, enjoy stronger monopolies, and may even be able to extort higher
revenues. In other words, the aggregate marginal revenue product of labour is
increasing in violence, and vice versa.
Criminal organisationscosts, on the other hand, are primarily wages paid to
their members. Whilst the organisations leaders dictate the extent of violence
employed, it is the foot soldiers that face the cost of implementing it during
the commission of their crimes. Levitt and Venkatesh 2000 show that, over a
four-year period, members of drug-selling gang in Chicago had a 25% chance of
dying (versus a 0.4% chance nationwide in the same demographic). Over the
same period, they also su¤ered an average of two non-fatal injuries (ranging from
gunshots and knife wounds to beatings). In order to attract and retain members,
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wages must incorporate compensation for the violence they are forced to inict.
This provides an incentive for criminal organisations to substitute between size
and violence. By increasing the amount of violence it requires its members to
employ, the organisations wage bill grows substantially, as each member must
be compensated. In this sense, the marginal cost of size is also increasing in
violence, and vice versa.
Whether violence and size are complement or substitute inputs in the organ-
isations prot function depends upon which e¤ect dominates. When the gangs
size increase, the marginal revenue it derives from violence also increases. For
example, with more members, the gang is able to extort money more success-
fully from its neighbourhood. This provides an incentive to increase violence.
However, any increase in violence requires that the gang compensate its mem-
bers. With a larger gang, more members need to be compensated. As such, an
increase in size also increases the marginal cost of violence. Whether violences
protability increases when size increases clearly depends upon whether marginal
revenue or marginal cost increases more. This will play a key role in determining
the e¤ectiveness of policy.
3.1.2 Opportunities in a Criminal Neighbourhood
Youths growing up within a criminal organisations territory face several di¢ cul-
ties when seeking work in the primary labour market. Such neighbourhoods
tend to develop reputations for criminal activity. If this leads employers to
engage in discrimination, and reduce their expectations regarding prospective
employeesproductivity from that neighbourhood, nding a job could be more
challenging (Verdier and Zenou 2004). In turn, poor prospects provide less incen-
tive to acquire human capital, creating a self-fullling prophecy (Lundberg and
Startz 1983). Austen-Smith and Fryer 2005 suggest that this may be compounded
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by peer pressure. Attempting to gain a good education can be interpreted as a
negative signal by a youths peer group. This provides a further disincentive to
acquire the skills necessary to seek employment. Combined, these two e¤ects can
lead to situations where the opportunities open to youths from such a neighbour-
hood are severely limited in the primary labour market.
In sharp contrast, opportunities abound in the informal economy. Success
in this industry requires the acquisition of a di¤erent set of skills. Youths must
develop an acceptance of, and willingness to use, violence. Ballester, Calvó-
Armengol, and Zenou 2010 explore the acquisition of criminal skill in a network.
As no schools o¤er certicates in intimidation (to this authors knowledge), they
suggest that youths may acquire such skills through a mixture of trial and error
(juvenile crime), and observing othersmistakes. This second channel - learning
from othersmistakes - can cause of a great deal of heterogeneity in youths
intrinsic ability to acquire criminal skills. In their analysis, Ballester et al suggest
that youths who feature centrally in a juvenile network will nd skill acquisition
far easier. They can observe others more easily, su¤ering less from trial and error.
Once they have joined the criminal organisation, they will nd inicting violence
far less costly as a result.
There is a broad range of criminological evidence in support of a learning
process by which individuals become accustomed to using violence. Various works
by Athens (summarised in Rhodes 2001) identify a common process of violenti-
zationundergone by a large sample of prisoners incarcerated for violent crime.
During this process, individuals are rst desensitised to violence, before learn-
ing (through positive reinforcement) that it is an appropriate response to minor
provocations. Juvenile gangs play an important role in this system. Esbensen
and Lynskey 2001 interviewed fourteen year-olds in the US who claimed to be
members of a juvenile gang. Of those, 25% claimed to have shot at someone.
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FBI statistics back up this claim. 80% of gang murders in 2009 were attributed
to juvenile gangs (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2010). This is not merely a
US phenomenon, however. Esbensen and Weerman 2005 conducted a similar
study in The Netherlands. They found that members of a juvenile gang were
four times more likely to be involved in violence than those not involved in a
gang. Similarly, Salagaev et al 2005 found that Russian gang youths were seven
times more likely to use violence to appropriate money or other goods. Whilst
a proportion of these results may be attributed to bravado, they nevertheless
indicate an acceptance of violence as a means to an end.
3.1.3 Tackling Organised Crime
Policies designed to tackle crime, and organised crime in particular, are motivated
by the fact that crime is costly to society. The scale of the total loss is ultimately
related to the organisations two transient features - intensity of violence and
membership size. In particular, criminal organisations inict three main exter-
nalities. As with all crime, by far the largest (Cohen and Piquero 2009) is the
fear of crime and victimisation costs that crime generates. With a larger gang,
one would expect that more individuals are going to be victims of crime. More-
over, the loss each individual su¤ers will be increasing in the amount of violence
inicted during the commission of each crime.
Secondly, society must expend resources protecting itself from the gang. This
includes the cost of preventative measures, from the policies discussed herein,
to the measures taken by individuals to protect themselves. It also includes the
resources expended investigating and prosecuting criminals, as well as the cost of
enforcing punishment. Once more, we would expect these costs to be increasing
in both size and violence. With more members, crime is more prevalent. As
such, the chance of becoming a victim of crime is higher. More crimes will need
96
Recruitment to Organised Crime Introduction
investigation, and will lead to more prosecutions. If violence is higher, a victim
su¤ers a greater loss. As such, the return to investing in protection is higher and
more investment will occur.
Finally, criminal organisations can be the cause of economic discrimination à
la Lundberg and Startz 1983. It is possible that even youths who gain positive
surplus by joining the gang would do better in the primary labour market if the
gang were not present. Employers in the primary labour market may believe
that youths from the gangs neighbourhood are less productive than those from
elsewhere. As such, they will o¤er lower wages to anyone applying from that
neighbourhood. This reduces the incentive to acquire primary labour market
skills, and creates a self-fullling prophecy. Without the gang, no such signal
would be generated and youths would be o¤ered higher wages. In this sense,
the gang is a source of economic discrimination2. Again, we would expect the
size of the discrimination to be increasing in both size and violence. If the gang
is larger, fewer youths will acquire primary labour market skills. As such, the
average amount of skill acquired will be lower. This will lead to lower wage o¤ers.
Similarly, if the gang is more violent, employers are likely to have a more critical
opinion of those from the neighbourhood. Again, lower wage o¤ers will result.
Since the inception of the economics of crime, economists have been suggest-
ing policies to reduce criminal activity. In Beckers seminal paper of 1968, he
proposed that a relatively cheap way to reduce crime was to simply increase the
ne incurred when caught. Since then, an abundance of policies have been put
forward, each aiming to manipulate the incentives of would-be criminals. This
paper considers four broad categories:
1. Increasing the severity of punishment;
2Indeed, the gang has an incentive to maximise the discrimination against youths from its
neighbourhood. Discrimination will enable it to o¤er lower wages for the same amount of
violence.
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2. increasing arrest and conviction rates;
3. primary labour market policies; and
4. prevention of juvenile crime.
The idea of increasing the severity of punishment dates back to Becker. By
increasing the size of ne, the expected payo¤ to committing crime is reduced,
given a constant arrest rate. This reduces the incentive to become involved in
crime, relative to staying honest. Related to this is increasing arrest and con-
viction rates. At rst pass, the e¤ects should be equivalent. Certainly, Burdett,
Lagos, and Wright 2004 nd that, in addition to reducing the incentive to com-
mit crime, both policies increase average wages and reduce inequality. However,
when we turn our attention to organised crime, this equivalence begins to break
down. Increasing arrest rates reduces the number of members available for the
organisation to utilise. This, in turn, will impact upon the wages they are willing
to o¤er, and even their optimal levels of violence. Whilst increasing the length
of prison terms may have similar e¤ects, other increases in severity may not.
Primary labour market policies cover an extremely broad range of sugges-
tions, all aiming to increase the wage paid in the formal economy. A by-product
of this is a fall in crime. Two cases stand out, however, for their direct tar-
geting of high-risk youths. The now famous Perry Preschool Programme (see
Parks 2000), focused on poor black preschool children with low IQs in the 1960s.
Participants attended preschool classes for 2.5 hours per day, ve days per week.
The preschool teachers also engaged with parents, visiting them for a further
1.5 hours each week. Participants were tracked over forty years, creating a rea-
sonably comprehensive data set on their educational, employment and criminal
outcomes. Recent analysis, whilst downgrading previous measures of success, still
suggest that the project yielded an internal rate of return of 7%-10% (Heckman,
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Moon, Pinto, Savelyev, and Yavitz 2010). The second example relates to a range
of case studies by the Education Innovation Laboratory at Harvard University.
The Harlem Childrens Zone in New York combines an intensive education pro-
gramme with access to community services (Dobbie and Fryer 2011). EdLabs are
also involved in numerous projects across the US aimed at high school students
(Fryer 2010). For example, the Paper Project in Chicago targets ninth and tenth
grade students. The organisers pay the students for passing their classes. They
can earn up to $2,000 per year, with 50% payable upon graduation from high
school.
Prevention of juvenile crime increases the cost of acquiring criminal skills, and
is at the heart of the arguments put forward by Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and
Zenou 2010. By disrupting juvenile networks, the authorities are able to increase
the cost of acquiring criminal skills. Youths are forced to learn in isolation, and
are unable to learn from other mistakes. They are thus less likely to join criminal
organisations, as they will nd inicting violence to be too costly.
Each policy works by reducing a criminal organisations demand for members
and/or violence. As mentioned above, if size and violence are complementary in
the prot function, a reduction in one creates an incentive to reduce the other.
Conversely, if they are substitutes, it creates an incentive to increase the other.
Under certain conditions, this countervailing e¤ect may actually cause net in-
creases in the demand for size or violence, increasing the loss su¤ered by society
at the hands of organised crime. It is this mechanism that the rest of the paper
is devoted to investigating.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I intro-
duce a model of recruitment to organised crime, and dene two di¤erent types of
gang. In section 3.3 I discuss the behaviour of the rst of these types: one which
can only o¤er a single wage and violence contract. Having done this, section
99
Recruitment to Organised Crime A Model of Recruitment to Organised Crime
3.4 discusses the likely impact of policy under various conditions, and highlights
where policies may have unintended consequences. Section 3.5 extends the analy-
sis, discussing a situation in which the gang can o¤er a range of jobs to youths.
Section 3.6 considers the e¤ects of policy in this more complicated setting. Fi-
nally, section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 AModel of Recruitment to Organised Crime
I present a model of organised crime recruitment. The economic environment,
hereafter referred to as the neighbourhood, consists of two sectors: the primary
labour market3 and the gang4. A mass N of heterogeneous youths grow up in
the neighbourhood. After investing in appropriate skills, they decide where to
seek employment. Whilst the primary labour market is passive, the gang acts as
a monopsonist employer of criminals in the neighbourhood. Gang leaders adjust
their approach to recruitment in order to maximise the gangs prots.
The gang o¤ers a contract schedule comprising of a series of wage and violence
intensity pairs (g (s) ; V (s)). Recruits to the gang are able to choose any contract,
s, they wish from the available menu. I assume that contracts are binding on
both sides, so by choosing a contract the recruit commits to inicting a given
level of violence in exchange for the associated wage.
The revenue each gang member, i, generates, be it from drug sales or ex-
tortion, prostitution or people tra¢ cking, depends primarily upon two charac-
teristics: the size of the gang (total membership, denoted by M  0) and the
intensity of violence they inict, V (si). Each individuals revenue stream is given
by the function5, r (M;V (si)). I assume that, at the gang level, Mr (M;V ) is
3This terminology follows Huang, Laing, and Wang 2004, who develop a similar model of
predation.
4Whilst the terminology used refers to a street gang, the model presented is equally relevant
to alternative forms of organised crime.
5The black box nature of revenue (as opposed to production) is purely for notational ease.
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subject to positive but diminishing marginal returns and constant returns to
scale. The constant returns to scale assumption is not necessary, but does make
for a simpler characterisation of the equilibrium and policy e¤ects. Moreover,
there is some degree of complementarity between violence and size, insofar as
r (M; 0) = r (0; V ) = 0 for all M;V  0.
As each gang member receives a wage, g (si), the prot they generate for the
gang is given by:
 (M; si)  r (M;V (si))  g (si) (3.1)
The gang chooses its contract schedule to maximise total prots:

 
M; (g (s) ; V (s))s0
 ME [ (M; si) ji joins ] (3.2)
The contract schedule becomes common knowledge, and is announced prior
to any decisions by youths.
Youths vary in their intrinsic criminal ability, denoted by  and distributed
exponentially with parameter  > 06. Youths simultaneously make two decisions.
Firstly, they choose how much criminal skill to acquire. They then decide which
sector to work in. Acquiring criminal skill is a costly process. However, those with
a higher criminal ability nd it easier than those with a lower ability. Denoting the
amount of criminal skill acquired by youth i by ci, the cost of acquiring criminal
skill is given by kJ

ci
i

. J () is a strictly increasing and convex function. k > 0
reects the fact that policy can inuence how easy it is to acquire criminal skills.
For simplicity, the primary labour market pays an exogenously given at wage
rate, w  0. One can consider this wage to be net of any cost of education, as
One can think about it as an indirect revenue function: the one resulting from the optimal
allocation of inputs across the wide range of activities the gang engages in. Kugler et al
2005 consider a more structured approach, decomposing revenue into the number of crimes
committed, and the bounty collected from each crime.
6Note that this automatically ensures that the hazard rate on the distribution of criminal
abilities is bounded, as suggested in the previous chapter.
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well as incorporating the probability of unemployment. Should the youth join
the gang instead, they choose a contract, si, from the available menu. However,
as discussed in the introduction, being involved in the gang is a dangerous a¤air.
There is a possibility of arrest and conviction. Following Becker 1968, arrest oc-
curs with probability p, resulting in a ne of size f 7 and wages being conscated8.
Moreover, gangs are violent enterprises. Whilst the gang leaders choose the level
of violence the gang is known for, it is the members who must bear the cost of
inicting that violence. It is at this point that acquiring criminal skill pays o¤.
By investing e¤ort in learning to be a criminal, youths become desensitised to
violence. So, whilst all gang members su¤er disutility from having to engage in
violence, those who have acquired large amounts of criminal skill su¤er less. In
particular, each youth su¤er disutility  V (si)
ci
. I assume that arrests are always
made after a crime has been committed. Since youths inict violence during
their crimes, they therefore su¤er this disutility irrespective of whether they are
subsequently arrested. The payo¤ from joining the gang is therefore:
G (si;i)  (1  p) g (si)  pf   V (si)
ci
  kJ

ci
i

(3.3)
In the remainder of the paper, I will distinguish between two extreme types of
gang. A gang is simple if it can only o¤er a single contract, (g; V ), to all members.
In this sense, it is a single-price monopsonist. All recruits receive the same wage,
and inict identical levels of violence. At the other end of the spectrum, a gang is
separating if it can o¤er a full range of contracts, (g (s) ; V (s))s0, and, in partic-
ular, if these contracts satisfy the youthsincentive compatibility constraints. As
7Whilst f is a constant in this model, the results that follow would apply equally to situations
in which di¤erent crimes receive di¤erent punishments. In that case, an increase in f would be
equivalent to a situation in which all punishments became more severe, but the gradient of the
punishment schedule remained unchanged.
8This is a simplication. In reality, there is some evidence to suggest that criminal organ-
isations pay members families whilst they are incarcerated. However, as they are unable to
take advantage of other membership benets, their gang wage does go down.
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a results, recruits fully separate according to their abilities; equivalent to second
degree price discrimination9. Whilst I am agnostic regarding which type of gang
better represents real criminal organisations, this enables me to demonstrate the
robustness of my policy results.
3.3 The Simple Gang
The model with a simple gang yields a pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The
gang announces its choices of V and g to maximise prots. Youths then acquire
criminal skills and choose a career, conditional on the announced V and g, as well
as their criminal ability, . As per usual, the equilibrium is found by backwards
induction.
3.3.1 Youth Decisions
Taking the announced level of violence and gang wage as given, a youth with
criminal ability i faces the following utility maximisation problem:
max
j2f0;1g;c0

(1  j)w + j

(1  p) g   pf   V
c

  kJ

c
i

(3.4)
where j 2 f0; 1g takes value one when the youth chooses to join the gang and
zero otherwise.
Consider rst the choice of criminal skill, conditional upon career choice. If
the youth chooses to join the primary labour market, criminal skill is of no use to
them. They consequently do not incur the cost of acquiring it, and select ci = 0.
9One can easily reinterpret this model in the terms described in Chapter 2. Since initiation
di¢ culty is su¢ cient to describe how the gangs reputation changes, the revenue it generates
could be redened as a function of gang size and initiation di¢ culty. Thus interpreting violence
in this model as initiation di¢ culty is relatively straightforward. Note, however, that the gangs
objective is di¤erent - prot maximisation.
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Figure 3.1: A -ability youths choice of criminal skill.
Conversely, if they decide to join the gang, they choose c (i; V ) satisfying:
V
c (i; V )
2 
k
i
J 0

c (i; V )
i

(3.5)
Equation (3.5) is represented in Figure 3.1. The resulting c (i; V ) is strictly
positive, and increasing in both the level of violence employed by the gang and
the criminal ability of the youth. More violence increases the marginal benet of
acquiring criminal skills, whereas increasing criminal ability reduces the marginal
cost.
Given youthschoice of criminal skill, it is straightforward to show that the
payo¤ to joining the gang is strictly increasing in criminal ability. Consider
a youth with ability 0 > 0. Suppose that they join the gang, and acquire
the optimal amount of criminal skill, c (0; V ). Now consider a youth with
ability 00 > 0. If this youth joins the gang and acquires the same amount,
c (0; V ), of criminal skill, then they will enjoy the same wage and su¤er the
same disutility from violence. However, since they have higher criminal ability,
the cost of acquiring c (0; V ) is lower. They can therefore guarantee themselves
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Figure 3.2: Youthspayo¤s from gang membership versus the primary labour
market.
a strictly higher payo¤ than the youth with criminal ability 0, and will do even
better by acquiring more criminal skill. Conversely, the payo¤ from joining the
primary labour market, w, is independent of a youths criminal ability. We can
therefore conclude that there exists some M such that a youth will join the gang
if and only if i  M (V; g). M is dened by:
(1  p) g   pf   V
c (M ; V )
  kJ

c (M ; V )
M

 w (3.6)
We call the youth with ability M the marginal youth. Since all youths with
ability above M join the gang, its size will be given by M = N (1  p) e M .
A proportion e M of the mass N youths join the gang. However, a proportion
p are arrested and convicted, making them unproductive (what Levitt 1996 calls
the incapacitation e¤ect).
Youthscareer choices are represented by Figure 3.2. An increase in the wage
o¤ered by the primary labour market increases the opportunity cost of joining
the gang, raising the ability of the marginal youth. Similarly, increases in the
conviction rate, severity of punishment, the degree of violence employed by the
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gang, or the cost of acquiring criminal skill reduces the payo¤ from joining the
gang. Once again, this raises the ability of the marginal youth and, by extension,
lowers the gangs size. The shaded area represents the surplus accruing to gang
members. Since the gang is a single price monopsonist in this setting, all gang
members receive a positive surplus through membership. Moreover, since the
cost of violence decreases with criminal ability, higher ability youths receive a
larger surplus than those with lower ability. Note that this does not imply that
organised crime generates a social surplus. It simply suggests that those who join
the gang are better o¤doing so in equilibrium. As noted in the introduction, gang
activity have a tendency to suppress formal wages and reduce the incentive to
invest in formal human capital. Thus it may be the case that, were the gang not
present, youths could guarantee themselves an even higher payo¤ in the primary
labour market.
3.3.2 Gang Leader Decisions
During the exposition of the model, the gang leaderships prot maximisation
problem was described as a decision regarding the degree of violence it expected
gang members to engage in, V , and a wage rate it o¤ered members, g. As a
result of these decisions, some membership size, M , was induced. It turns out
that a computationally easier way to view the gang leaderships problem is to
think about them choosing the degree of violence, and then compensating gang
members su¢ ciently to induce a chosen gang size. The extent of the compensation
is derived as follows. In order to acquire gang size of precisely M , it is necessary
that the marginal youth have criminal ability:
M =
lnN + ln (1  p)  lnM

(3.7)
This youth must therefore be indi¤erent between the gang and the primary
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labour market. In order to ensure this with degree of violence V , the gang must
o¤er a wage:
g (M;V )  w + pf
1  p +
V
cM (1  p)
+
k
1  pJ

cM
lnN + ln (1  p)  lnM

(3.8)
where cM (M;V ) is the criminal skill of the marginal youth, dened implicitly
by:
V
cM (M;V )
2 
k
lnN + ln (1  p)  lnMJ
0

cM (M;V )
lnN + ln (1  p)  lnM

(3.9)
The gang leaderships prot maximisation problem thus becomes:
(M; V ) = arg max
M2[0;N ];V0
fMr (M;V ) Mg (M;V )g (3.10)
Before continuing to outline the solution to (3.10), it is expedient to discuss
an issue alluded to in the introduction. When violence increases, the marginal
revenue product of size increases. Gang members face less disruption, a stronger
monopoly, and may even be able to extort higher prices. Concurrently, however,
the marginal cost of labour also increases. Each member is being forced to engage
in more violence, increasing the loss they su¤er as a result. The gang must
o¤er additional compensation according to (3.8), in order to prevent those with
relatively low criminal ability from opting to join the primary labour market
instead. These two e¤ects counteract one another, and consequently, the net
e¤ect on the marginal prot generate by size is unclear. Determining which
e¤ect dominates is not only helpful when describing the equilibrium, but proves
to have important implications for the impact of policy in this environment. It
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is straightforward to show that:
MV =
1
McM (1  p)

   1
M
1 + "M
2 + "M

(3.11)
where  = MrMV (M;V )
rV (M;V )
> 0 is the cross elasticity of the individual marginal revenue
product of violence with respect to labour, and "M =
cM
M
J 00

cM
M

J 0

c
M
M
 is the elasticity
of the marginal cost of acquiring criminal skills with respect to c

M
M
. Clearly, 
represents the relative increase in marginal revenue product of violence. The
second term in parenthesis in (3.11) reects the relative increase in the wage
the gang o¤ers. As the degree of violence increases, the amount of compensation
required increases. However, this e¤ect is tempered by the fact that youths invest
in more criminal capital.
These terms depend upon the functional forms of r (; ) and J () respectively.
It is therefore helpful to make one of two assumptions:
Assumption 4 (Complements) The marginal revenue product of violence is
su¢ ciently elastic with respect to size to ensure that MV is always positive.
Assumption 5 (Substitutes) The marginal revenue product of violence is suf-
ciently inelastic with respect to size to ensure that MV is always negative.
These assumptions are illustrated in Figure 3.3. When  is large relative
to M , the marginal cost of compensating youths for increasing amounts of vio-
lence is relatively small compared to the increase in marginal revenue. As such,
Assumption 4 holds. In particular, if  > 1
M
, then the revenue e¤ect always
dominates the cost e¤ect, irrespective of the functional form of J (). Conversely,
if  is small relative to M , the opposite is true. If  < 1
2M
, the relative increase
in marginal revenue is insu¢ cient to compensate for the relative increase in mar-
ginal cost, irrespective of the functional form of J (). For  in between these
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Figure 3.3: The range of values over which Assumption 4 and Assumption 5 hold.
two values, the situation is less clear, and the convexity of the criminal skill cost
function becomes important.
We are now in a position to outline the gang leaderschoices.
Proposition 8 (Prot Maximisation) Suppose that  > 0, and that either
Assumption 4 or Assumption 5 holds. Then the gang leaderships prot max-
imisation problem given by (3.10) has a unique solution, with V  > 0 and
0 < M < N .
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.
Requiring that  > 0 serves two purposes and is su¢ cient to ensure a max-
imum exists under both Assumptions 4 and 5. The marginal revenue product
of violence declines as violence increases. However, as the gang requires greater
feats of violence from its members, each youth optimally invests more heavily in
acquiring criminal skills. As a result, each marginal increase in violence, dV , has
a smaller impact upon the cost youths bear from inicting violence, dV
c , since c

is larger. Consequently, the gang must increase its compensation for inicting
violence by smaller amounts as violence increases: the marginal cost of violence
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is also decreasing. In order for a maximum to exist, we require that marginal
revenue decline faster than the marginal cost. A su¢ cient condition for ensuring
this is that  >  1
2
.
Under Assumption 4,  >  1
2
guarantees that a unique maximum exists.
Unfortunately, if violence and size are substitutes, the incentive to substitute may
be strong enough to move the gang towards one of the extremes (high violence,
tiny membership or vice versa). To counteract this, we require that a decline
in violence reduces the marginal revenue product of size su¢ ciently as to admit
interior maximum. This, in turn, requires the slightly stronger condition that
 > 0.
Assumptions 4 and 5 are not necessary, but are su¢ cient to ensure uniqueness
of the equilibrium. To see this, consider the restricted factor demand functions,eV (M) and fM (V ). These are derived directly from the rst order conditions
(below), and give the gangs optimal choice of violence and membership size
respectively, holding the other input constant:
rV

M; eV   1
cM (1  p)
 0 (3.12)
rM
fM;V +Mr fM;V   g V;fM  V
fMcfM (1  p)  0 (3.13)
By varying size in equation 3.12, it is possible to trace the gangs optimal
choice of violence in (M;V )-space. Similarly, by varying violence in equation
3.13, one acquires the gangs optimal size. Maintaining the assumption that
 > 0, Figure 3.4 displays the restricted demand functions for complements and
substitutes. In both cases, the gang leadersequilibrium choices are described
by the intersection of the two curves, where their choice of violence is optimal
given their size, and their choice of membership size is optimal given their level
of violence. It is clear from Figure 3.4, however, that the comparative statics are
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Figure 3.4: Restricted factor demands with complements and substitutes.
di¤erent. When membership size and violence are complementary, both restricted
demand functions slope upwards10. In this case, an exogenous increase in, say, the
gangs restricted demand for violence ( eV (M) shifts upwards) makes increasing
size more protable. Consequently, both increase concurrently. In contrast, when
size and violence are substitutes, both curves slope downwards. An exogenous
increase in the gangs restricted demand for violence makes size less protable.
In this case, the gang optimally reduces size as violence increases.
3.4 Policy with a Simple Gang
Using the framework developed in the previous section, we will now discuss the
e¤ect on the social loss from organised crime of the four broad policy areas
outlined in the introduction. Under certain conditions to be made clear below,
we will nd that policies can have unintended consequences. In particular, anti-
crime policies could, perversely, increase the amount of violence the gang employs
10The slopes of the restricted demand curves are derived by a simple application of the
Implicit Function Theorem. eV (M) is dened by V M; eV   0. This yields:
eVM =  MV
V V
Since  >   12 , V V < 0. Under Assumption 4, MV > 0, so eVM > 0. Under Assumption
5, MV < 0, so eVM < 0. An equivalent argument holds for fMV , noting that the slope of the
curve in Figure 3.4 is 1fMV .
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(but never its membership size).
Each of the policies in the introduction is associated with a parameter in the
model. Specically:
1. Increasing the severity of punishment increases f .
2. Primary labour market policies increase w.
3. Increasing the arrest or conviction rate increases p.
4. Prevention of juvenile crime disrupts the ability of youths to learn criminal
skills, increasing k.
Note that the aim of this section is not to discuss optimal policy. That would
require modelling of the technologies involved in manipulating these parameters,
the associated cost functions, and a more detailed discussion of the exact nature of
the social loss function. Rather, the aim is more modest: to highlight conditions
under which policies designed to combat organised crime may in fact worsen one
of its features. Each of these policies are under active discussion in both academic
and political circles. I hope to help inform these debates by comparing each in
the context of my model. I will rst derive results for a generic policy, , before
turning attention to the specic policies above.
3.4.1 Results for a Generic Policy
We can view the impact of a generic policy by considering its e¤ects on the
restricted demand functions. When a policy is implemented, it can change youths
incentives in two ways. Firstly, it may reduce the net benet they gain from
joining the gang. In order to retain members, this may necessitate the gang
raising the wage they o¤er, or reducing the cost of violence they inict upon
their membership. Higher wages increase the marginal cost of size for the gang,
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as each new youth must be paid more, as shown in (3.13). Faced with the
increased marginal cost, and no equivalent increase in marginal revenue, a prot-
maximising gang will reduce its restricted demand for members, fM as marginal
prot derived from size, M , becomes negative.
Secondly, a policy may a¤ect how youths respond to changes in violence or
gang wages. Some policies increase youthssensitivity to violence. Once again,
this will force the gang to increase its wage at every gang size, to retain the
services of the marginal youth. Moreover, any increases in the level of violence
the gang enforces will now require a larger amount of compensation. As such, the
marginal cost of violence will also increase. As there is no equivalent increase in
marginal revenue, the marginal prot derived from violence, V , will also become
negative. In this case, the gang will optimally reduce its restricted demand for
violence, eV .
This intuition, combined with the rst panel of Figure 3.4, leads us very
quickly to our rst result:
Proposition 9 (Policy with Complements) Suppose that  > 0 and that
Assumption 4 holds. Then any policy which reduces either M or V and does
not increase the other, reduces both the amount of violence the gang employs, and
the number of members that the gang chooses to recruit.
This result is illustrated in Figure 3.5. If M declines, then the restricted
demand for size shifts inwards. Similarly, if V declines, then the restricted
demand for violence shifts inwards. Since both curves are upward sloping, any
inward shift leads, unambiguously, to a fall in both size and violence. Now, any
fall in, say, size reduces the marginal revenue product of violence. However,
since fewer gang members need to be compensated for changes in violence, the
marginal cost of violence also falls. If violence and size are complements, the
fall in marginal revenue exceeds the fall in marginal cost, and the gang reduces
113
Recruitment to Organised Crime Policy with a Simple Gang
Figure 3.5: Policy e¤ects with complements.
its optimal level of violence. In turn, this causes a further reduction in size.
This cycle reinforces the decline in both size and violence, leading to the result.
We can therefore conclude that, if membership size and violence are su¢ ciently
strong revenue complements, any policy will be e¤ective in reducing the loss
society su¤ers at the hands of the gang. In Figure 3.5, L is the locus of all
size and violence combinations giving the same social loss as (M; V ); it is an
iso-loss curve. As each policy leads to a reduction in both inputs, the resulting
prot-maximising combination lies below L, indicating a smaller loss.
Unfortunately, the case with substitutes is not so clear cut, as shown in Figure
3.6. In contrast to complements, reductions in size cause the gang to substitute
towards violence, and vice versa. As with complements, a fall in, say, size reduces
both the marginal revenue product and the marginal cost of violence. Now,
however, the decline in marginal cost exceeds the decline in marginal revenue,
causing an endogenous increase in the restricted demand for violence. Similarly,
a decline in violence makes size more protable, causing an endogenous increase
in the restricted demand for size. Consequently, if one of these e¤ects were
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Figure 3.6: Policy e¤ects with substitutes.
to o¤set the initial impact of the policy, we could have a situation in which
either membership size or violence increases (but, fortunately, not both). As a
result, it may even be possible that a policy designed to reduce the social loss
from organised crime may actually increase it. The term which determines these
e¤ects is M
V 
, as the following proposition makes clear:
Proposition 10 (Policy with Substitutes) Suppose that  > 0 and that As-
sumption 5 holds. Consider any policy which reduces either M or V and does
not increase the other:
1. If M
V 
<
eVM  then the policy reduces violence, but increases size.
2. If M
V 
2
eVM  ; 1jfMV j

then the policy reduces both size and violence.
3. If M
V 
> 1jfMV j then the policy reduces size, but increases violence.
Each case is outlined in Figure 3.6. The fact that  > 0 ensures that all three
scenarios are feasible, i.e. that
eVM  < 1jfMV j . The immediate e¤ect of the policy
is to (weakly) reduce the restricted demand for each input. Which case occurs
depends, crucially, upon the size of each shift. In case one, the restricted demand
for violence shifts down by more than the restricted demand for size. eV is dened
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by V = 0. Fixing size, we have that the vertical shift, eV, is given by:
V V eV + V  = 0
() eV =  V 
V V
(3.14)
Similarly, fM is dened by M = 0. Fixing size again, and considering the
vertical shift, we have that:
VMV + M = 0
() V =  M
MV
(3.15)
So if the restricted demand for violence shifts downwards by more than the
restricted demand for size:
V 
V V
>
M
MV
()
eVM  > M
V 
(3.16)
Intuitively, the marginal prot accruing to violence declines by much more
than the marginal prot accruing to size. As such, the restricted demand for
violence decreases dramatically. This fall in violence decreases both the marginal
revenue and marginal cost of size. However, since the two inputs are substitutes,
marginal cost reduces more, o¤setting the initial fall in marginal prot. In case
one, the fall in violence is so large that the marginal prot accruing to size actually
becomes positive, creating an incentive for the gang to become larger.
Identical arguments can be made for the remaining two cases. In case two, the
horizontal shift of the restricted demand for violence must exceed the horizontal
shift in the restricted demand for size, and vice versa for the vertical shift. Neither
input su¤ers a particularly large fall in marginal prot, and the substitution
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e¤ects are not su¢ cient to counteract the initial declines in demand. In case
three, the horizontal shift of the restricted demand for size must exceed the
equivalent shift for violence. This time, the marginal prot accruing to size falls
dramatically, creating a strong incentive for the gang to substitute away from
size, towards violence.
The cross-elasticity, , plays a large role in determining which case arises, as
it is the key parameter in describing how strongly the gang chooses to substitute
between violence and size. In particular, when  is large,
fMV  and eVM  both
decrease, as the two inputs are strong revenue complements, leading to large
declines in their respective marginal revenue products. As such, case two becomes
more prominent. The size of the internal
eVM  ; 1jfMV j

grows. Conversely, if  is
small, there is a high degree of substitutability between size and violence, and it
becomes increasingly likely that one of the two extreme cases occurs.
3.4.2 Results for Specic Policies
The direct e¤ect of each of class of policy is to reduce the marginal prot of either
violence, size or both inputs. As such, under Assumption 4, Proposition 9 holds,
and both violence and size are unequivocally diminished. The loss society su¤ers
as a result of the gang will always decline. For each policy, we will therefore focus
on what happens under Assumption 5. Under this assumption, it is possible that
a fall in demand for one input will cause an increase in demand for the other.
The social loss the gang inicts may therefore increase.
Severity of Punishment (f)
When violence and size are substitutes, the e¤ects of an increase in the severity of
punishment are unambiguous. The situation is illustrated in Figure 3.7. When
severity increases, the marginal cost of size increases (from (3.13)). Recruits
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Figure 3.7: E¤ect of an increase in the severity of punishment (f) or the market
wage (w)
require a greater degree of compensation for the possibility of being punished,
increasing the wage the gang o¤ers for any given gang size. As a result, the gangs
restricted demand for members falls (Mf < 0). However, if they still decide to
join the gang, greater severity of punishment has no impact upon youthswill-
ingness to acquire criminal skills (given by (3.5)). In particular, for each given
gang size, the criminal skills acquired by the marginal youth remain unchanged.
Consequently, there is no exogenous change in the gangs marginal cost of vio-
lence. By (3.12), the gangs restricted demand for violence remains unchanged
(V f = 0). We are rmly in case three.
As the gang reduces its size, the marginal cost of violence also declines. Not
only are there fewer members to compensate for changes in violence, but those
that are left are less sensitive to those changes. The marginal revenue product
of violence is also reduced, as membership size and violence are revenue comple-
ments. Under Assumption 5, the fall in marginal cost exceeds the fall in marginal
revenue, and the gang chooses to increase the amount of violence it inicts. In-
creasing the severity of punishment causes the gang to unambiguously substitute
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away from membership size, towards a greater degree of violence:
Lemma 5 Suppose that  > 0 and that Assumption 5 holds. Then any increase
in the severity of punishment will result in fewer gang members, but more vio-
lence.
If society su¤ers su¢ ciently from increases in the intensity of violence that
the gang chooses to inict (the marginal rate of substitution of the iso-loss curve,
L, is su¢ ciently low), then this policy could lead to an increase in the social loss
the gang creates.
Primary Labour Market Policies (w)
The e¤ect of an increase in the market wage is similar to that of an increase
in the severity of punishment. The scenario is, once again, shown in Figure 3.7.
The opportunity cost of joining the gang is increased. The gang must o¤er higher
wages at every gang size, increasing the marginal cost of size. Consequently, by
(3.13), the marginal cost of size exceeds the marginal revenue it generates, and
the restricted demand for membership size declines (Mw < 0). Upon deciding
to join the gang, youths incentives to acquire criminal skill are una¤ected by
the increase in w. As such, for each given size, the marginal cost to the gang of
increasing violence is unchanged (V w = 0). As a result, by (3.12), the restricted
demand for violence once again remains the same.
Gang size falls. Whilst the marginal revenue product of violence declines,
smaller gangs require less compensation for violent behaviour. There are fewer
members to pay, and those who remain are relatively insensitive to violence. The
marginal cost of violence declines by more than its marginal revenue, and the
gang increases the amount of violence it inicts:
Lemma 6 Suppose that  > 0 and that Assumption 5 holds. Then any improve-
ment in the primary labour market will result in fewer gang members, but more
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violence.
Again, if society is particularly sensitive to changes in the intensity of violence,
relative to changes in size, labour market policies could actually increase the social
cost of the gang.
Arrest and Conviction Rate (p)
The arrest and conviction rate has the most complex e¤ect of any of the poli-
cies areas I consider. The situation is shown in Figure 3.8. An increase in the
probability of conviction reduces the restricted demand for membership size for
three reasons. For a given level of violence, an increase in p increases the wage
the gang must o¤er to maintain its membership. Not only does it become more
likely that gang members will be punished (increasing pf), but the probability
that they will be deprived of their wages also rises. Youths discount for this
in (3.8), and consequently require even more pay in order to join. These two
outcomes constitute Levitts deterrence e¤ect (1996). Moreover, maintaining the
same size of gang involves recruiting lower ability members, as more members
are locked away (and are thus unproductive). Since lower ability individuals are
more sensitive to violence, a third increase in the wage the gang o¤ers is required.
This is Levitts incapacitation e¤ect. Combined, these three wage increases raise
the marginal cost of size in (3.13). As marginal revenue is thus far una¤ected,
the restricted demand for size declines (Mp < 0).
In contrast to the previous two policies, increasing the probability of convic-
tion also reduces the restricted demand for violence. For given gang size, the
ability of the marginal youth is lower. Lower ability youths nd it more costly
to invest in criminal skills. The marginal youth is thus relatively sensitive to
changes in violence (cM falls in (3.9)). As a result, any increase in violence
requires a greater increase in the wage the gang o¤ers, in order to retain their
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Figure 3.8: E¤ect of an increase in the arrest and conviction rate (p) or in the
prevention of juvenile crime (k).
membership. In addition, youths incur the cost of violence irrespective of whether
they are arrested or not. Since there is a greater chance that they will not receive
their wages, they require proportionally more compensation should the amount
of violence they inict increase. Both these e¤ects increase the marginal cost of
violence in (3.12), reducing the restricted demand for violence (V p < 0).
In sum, both the restricted demand curves shift inward. Consequently, de-
pending upon the size of the shifts, any of the cases outlined in Proposition 10
appear feasible. This turns out not to be the case, as we have the following result:
Lemma 7 Suppose that  > 0 and that Assumption 5 holds. Then any improve-
ment in the arrest and conviction rate may result in:
1. Fewer gang members, but more violence; or
2. fewer gang members and less violence.
It can never be the case that more gang members, but less violence results.
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The result hinges upon . If  is large, then membership size and violence
are relatively weak prot substitutes. As such, when the restricted demand for
violence and size decline, the incentive to substitute is insu¢ cient to cause the
gang to increase their demand for either input. Conversely, if  is low, there is
a strong incentive to substitute and the gang could potentially increase demand
for either input. In particular, there is a threshold value of , call it pV >  1,
such that if  < pV then the gang has a strong enough incentive to increase
demand for violence. Similarly, there exists pM >  1 such that if  < pM then
the gang increases membership size. It is possible to show that pM < 0. As we
require that  > 0, we can rule out the gangs increasing its membership as a
result of increased arrests and convictions. The increase in the marginal cost of
membership size always dominates the increase in marginal revenue, even taking
into account changes in violence.
The same cannot be said for pV . It is therefore possible that the level of
violence the gang inicts actually increases. However, if the gang size is either
very large or very small, violence will certainly decline. If it is small, then the
ability of the marginal youth is high. When the arrest and conviction rate is
increased, the marginal cost of size remains relatively unchanged. Wages are
very close to w+pf
1 p , as the marginal youth does not require a lot of compensation
for the violence they inict. As a result, since the marginal revenue product
of size is large for a small gang, gang size also remains relatively stable. This
provides a relatively weak incentive to substitute. The increase in the marginal
revenue product of violence is insu¢ cient to counteract the exogenous fall in the
restricted demand for violence.
When gang size is very large, the ability of the marginal youth is low. They
therefore require a large amount of compensation for the violence the gang re-
quires them to inict. Any fall in the restricted demand for size will thus decrease
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the marginal cost of size substantially. Once again, the result is that the gangs
size does not decline very much. The incentive to substitute is dominated by the
decline in the restricted demand for violence.
Relative to the previous two policies, increasing the arrest and conviction
rate is relatively successful at reducing the loss society su¤ers. Whilst it may be
the case that violence increases, this only happens when size and violence are
extremely strong prot substitutes ((M0; V 0) in Figure 3.8, in this case lying
above L). Otherwise, even under Assumption 5, both size and violence decline,
leading to an unambiguous fall in the social loss ((M00; V 00) in Figure 3.8).
Prevention of Juvenile Crime (k)
The e¤ects of an increase in k are shown in Figure 3.8. As with the conviction
rate, increasing the e¤ort to prevent juvenile crime impacts upon both the re-
stricted demand for size, and the restricted demand for violence. For each degree
of violence, youths nd it more di¢ cult to acquire criminal skills (from (3.5)).
They su¤er more from the violence the gang requires them to inict. Youths
therefore require a larger wage to retain their membership. Moreover, the mar-
ginal youth is disproportionately a¤ected by the policy. As the youth with the
lowest ability, they are more sensitive to changes to the cost of acquiring criminal
skills (see (3.9)). Any attempt by the gang to increase its membership therefore
require a larger increase in the wage than before the introduction of the pol-
icy. Both the higher wage and the larger wage increase required to recruit more
members increase the marginal cost of size for the gang (in (3.13)), reducing its
restricted demand (Mk < 0).
Since all youths acquire fewer criminal skills, the marginal cost of violence
increases as well. In particular, for each gang size, increasing violence whilst
retaining the marginal youth is more expensive. With fewer criminal skills, they
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are more sensitive to violence, and consequently require a greater increase in their
wage to compensate them for the additional violence the gang wishes them to
inict. As the marginal revenue product of violence is una¤ected by the policy,
the increased marginal cost induces the gang to reduce its restricted demand for
violence as well (V k < 0).
Once more, it appears that all three cases in Proposition 10 are feasible.
Both restricted demand curves have shifted inwards. Again, this turns out to be
incorrect:
Lemma 8 Suppose that  > 0 and that Assumption 5 holds. Then any improve-
ment in the prevention of juvenile crime may result in:
1. Fewer gang members, but more violence; or
2. fewer gang members and less violence.
It can never be the case that more gang members, but less violence results.
The value of  is again critical in determining which outcome occurs. As with
changes in the arrest and conviction rate, if  is large, then membership size and
violence are weak prot substitutes. The endogenous increase in protability of
each input resulting from the decline in the other is never su¢ cient to o¤set the
exogenous decline resulting from the policy change. However, there exists kV > 0
such that, if  < kV then the endogenous increase in the protability of violence
resulting from the decline in size dominates the initial decline. In this case, the
gang will increase its demand for violence. Similarly, there is kM >  1 such that,
if  < kM then demand for membership size increases.
As before, it is possible to rule out increases in membership size, since kM < 0.
The increase in the marginal revenue product of size resulting from an exogenous
decline in violence is never large enough to o¤set the increase in the marginal cost
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caused by the increase in juvenile crime prevention. We can also rule out increases
in violence for very large or very small gangs. In both cases, the improvement
in the prevention of juvenile crime will result in relatively small changes in gang
size, creating a very weak incentive to substitute towards violence.
Prevention of juvenile crime also proves to be relatively e¤ective at reducing
the loss society su¤ers. Once again, size and violence need to be extremely weak
revenue complements to cause an increase in gang violence. It is quite possible
that both will decline as a result of the policy, reducing the social cost of the
gang.
3.5 The Separating Gang
The analysis performed in the previous few sections was done under the assump-
tion that the gang was unable to discriminate between individuals. It o¤ered one
wage rate, and one level of violence. I now relax that assumption, and instead
ask how the various policies perform when the gang is free to implement any
wage scheme and associated violence schedule. I consider symmetric separating
perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In this setting, such an equilibrium consists of a
prot-maximising contract schedule, (g (s) ; V (s))s0, implemented by the gang,
followed by career, criminal skill and contract decisions for each youth. I focus
on direct mechanisms. As before, I proceed by backwards induction.
3.5.1 Youth Decisions
In the model with a separating gang, a youth with criminal ability i faces the
following utility maximisation problem:
max
j2f0;1g;c0;s0

(1  j)w + j

(1  p) g (s)  pf   V (s)
c

  kJ

c
i

(3.17)
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The youths choice of criminal skill and career are identical to before. If they
join the gang, they will acquire criminal skills c (i; si ) satisfying:
V (si ;)
c (i; si )
2 
k
i
J 0

c (i; si )
i

(3.18)
otherwise, they will not invest anything. Moreover, they will join the gang if:
(1  p) g (si )  pf  
V (si )
c (i; si )
  kJ

c (i; si )
i

 w (3.19)
If a youth of ability i joins the gang, it is straightforward to show that all youths
with ability  > i also join the gang. Suppose that the youth with ability i
chooses contract si . If they join, it must be the case that G
 (si ;i) > w. Now,
any youth choosing contract si is o¤ered the same (g (s

i ) ; V (s

i )). Moreover, as
discussed in Section 3.3.1, for given g and V , a youths payo¤ is increasing in
. So any youth with ability greater than i can guarantee themselves a payo¤
greater than w by joining the gang and choosing contract si . The payo¤ from
joining the gang must once again be strictly increasing in ability. Consequently,
there exists a marginal youth, who has the lowest ability of any gang member,
M  0.
Finally, each youth who decides to join the gang chooses a contract to max-
imise the payo¤ they receive from their membership:
(1  p) @g
@s
(s (i))  1
c (i; si )
@V
@s
(s (i)) (3.20)
A youth will therefore truthfully reveal their ability if and only if i satises
the above equation, i.e. s (i) = i.
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3.5.2 Gang Leader Decisions
The gang leadersdecisions are signicantly more complicated. They must now
choose a prot-maximising contract schedule, subject to its being implementable.
The form of an implementable contract schedule is given by the following:
Proposition 11 (Implementable Contracts) A contract schedule, f(g (s) ; V (s))gs0,
is implementable if and only if it is of the form:
g (s) =
w + pf
1  p +
V (s)
c (1  p) +
k
1  pJ

c
s

+
1
1  p
Z s
t=M
V (t)
tc
dt (3.21)
Proof. See Appendix 3.B.
This relationship between wages and violence bears a tremendous similarity
to that of the marginal youth in a simple gang, given by (3.8). The rst three
terms simply state that each youth must be compensated for the expected costs
incurred by joining the gang. The di¤erence arises in the nal term of (3.21),
and is most succinctly explained by considering a youths net payo¤ from joining
the gang:
w +
Z 
t=M
V (t)
tc
dt (3.22)
In a perfect information setting, the gang would choose the level of violence they
wished each youth to engage in, and then simply pay them enough to make
them indi¤erent between joining the gang or joining the primary labour market.
Youths would earn w irrespective of their career choice. However, the gang must
elicit each youths ability. Since a higher ability youth can gain positive surplus
by pretending to be of a lower ability, the gang must pay an informational rent
to ensure that they are made at least as well o¤ by revealing their true ability.
An example of an implementable contract schedule is shown in Figure 3.9, dis-
playing indi¤erence curves for two youths. Higher ability youths are less sensitive
to violence. As such, less compensation is required when violence is increased in
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Figure 3.9: An example of an implementable contract
order to maintain indi¤erence: their indi¤erence curves are steeper. The contract
schedule is designed so that each youth weakly prefers the contract designed for
their ability to all others. For example, the youth with ability 0 >  prefers
(g0; V 0) to (g; V ).
An important feature of an implementable contract is made clear by Figure
3.9: wages and violence must both be increasing in ability. To see this, note
that for a youth with ability 0 to prefer a bundle (g0; V 0) to (g; V ) it must lie
to the south-east of the 0-indi¤erence curve passing through (g; V ). Similarly,
for a youth with ability  to prefer (g; V ) over (g0; V 0), (g0; V 0) must lie to the
north-west of the -indi¤erence curve passing through (g; V ). Only contracts in
the shaded region satisfy both properties, so g and V must both be increasing in
ability.
Restricting attention to implementable contracts, we now turn our attention
to the gangs prot maximisation decision. Since the gangs choice of violence
uniquely determines the wage it must pay to its members, it is su¢ cient once
again to think of the gang as maximising prots with respect to fV (s)gs0 and
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M . Its optimal choice of g (s) will then be given by (3.21). In other words, the
gang solves:
 
(V  (s))s0 ;M
 = arg max
(V (s))s0;M0

N (1  p)
Z 1
s=M
 (s;M)e sds

(3.23)
subject to : (3.21)
The solution is described in two stages. Firstly, for each ability and each
gang size, I describe the optimal choice of violence. This provides a restricted
violence schedule, dependent upon the gangs membership size
eV (s;M)
s0
.
Then, incorporating this restricted violence schedule into (3.23), the gang chooses
membership size to maximise its prots. Without further ado:
Proposition 12 (Restricted Violence Schedule) Suppose that, for each ,
 () >  1
2
and 1 +
c

C000( c

 )
C00( c )
> "
 
c


. Then, for each gang size, M , there exists
a unique violence schedule,
eV (s;M)
s0
that maximises prots.
Proof. See Appendix 3.C.
For each gang size and each   M , the gang selects eV () to satisfy:
rV

M; eV ()  1
c (1  p)  
1
c (1  p)
1 + "
 (2 + ")
 0 (3.24)
where c = c (; ) and " =
c

J 00( c

 )
J 0( c )
, as before. This expression is very similar
to (3.12). The marginal benet to the gang of increasing a members violence
comes in the form of additional revenue they will be able to generate. The
marginal cost comprises two elements. Firstly, it is necessary to compensate the
individual for the disutility they su¤er from inicting more violence. The second
element of the marginal cost represents the need to increase the informational
rent paid to members. Increasing violence for a youth with ability  increases
the informational rent to all members with ability greater than . The rent paid
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to those with lower ability is una¤ected (see (3.21)). As increasing size involves
attracting lower ability members to the gang, the increase in informational rent
is una¤ected by the size of the gang.
Substituting the restricted violence schedule into (3.23), we are now in a
position to calculate the gangs optimal size.
Proposition 13 (Prot Maximisation with Separation) Suppose that Propo-
sition 12 is satised, and that rMM > 0, rMMV < 0, rMV rMV V < 0 and @
3
@V 2@
< 0.
Then there exists a unique gang size, 0 < M < N , that maximises prots.
Proof. See Appendix 3.D.
Given a violence schedule, the gang choose a membership size to satisfy:
r
fM;V  fM g  fM+N (1  p)Z 1
s=fM
rM
fM;V (s)e sds  V  fM
McM (1  p)
 0
(3.25)
where cM = c
 (M ; M).When the gang increases its size, its new members gener-
ate revenue equal to r
fM;V  fM. The marginal cost has several components.
First, each new member must be paid. Their wage is given by (3.21), but does
not need to incorporate any informational rent since a youth would never choose
to over perform during initiation. Secondly, since the aggregate revenue function
has diminishing marginal returns, it must be the case that an increase in size
reduces the revenue each inframarginal member is able to generate. Finally, the
gang must increase the wages paid to all youths who were already planning to
join the gang. Otherwise, there would exist a higher ability youth who would
choose to acquire the low wage-low violence contract, s = M .
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3.6 Policy with a Separating Gang
In section 3.4, the extent to which violence and membership size were revenue
complements was critical in determining the e¤ects of policy. When a policy
reduced demand for, say, size, the marginal revenue product and marginal cost of
violence fell. With fewer members, the gang was less able to convert violence into
higher revenue. However, the gang needed to compensate fewer members for the
violence they were required to inict. When size and violence were strong revenue
complements, the fall in the marginal revenue product of violence exceeded the
fall in marginal cost. The demand for violence fell. Conversely, if they were weak
revenue complements, the opposite was true.
This intuition proves to hold when the gang is capable of separating out re-
cruits. When gang size increases, there are two opposing e¤ects on the marginal
revenue product of violence. Firstly, as there are more members inicting vio-
lence, aggregate revenue from violence increases. The increased membership will
also impact upon the personal marginal revenue products of violence of those al-
ready in the gang. Gang members may be able to take advantage of network
externalities and returns to scale, increasing their personal marginal revenue
products of violence. Conversely, congestion e¤ects may reduce the personal
marginal revenue product, as more individuals are attempting to extract rents
from the neighbourhood. So long as the rst e¤ect dominates the second at the
gang level, we are consistent with the model of the previous section, as the mar-
ginal revenue product of violence will rise on aggregate. However, the degree of
revenue complementarity will be strongly a¤ected by whether the personal mar-
ginal revenue product of violence increases or decreases. This leads us to make
one of two assumptions:
Assumption 6 (Separating Complements) An individual gang members mar-
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ginal revenue product of violence is strictly increasing in the gangs size:
rMV (M;V ) > 0
Assumption 7 (Separating Substitutes) An individual gang members mar-
ginal revenue product of violence is strictly decreasing in the gangs size:
rMV (M;V ) < 0
Clearly, if Assumption 6 holds, then size and violence are very strong rev-
enue complements. When the gangs membership increases, additional members
increase the amount of violence the gang is able to bring to bear, and enable ex-
isting members to take advantage of network externalities. This makes violence
more protable for each member. If Assumption 7 holds, on the other hand, size
and violence are weak revenue complements. Whilst the additional members en-
able the gang to inict more violence, the neighbourhood becomes satiated and
existing gang members see their personal returns to violence fall.
3.6.1 Results for a Generic Policy
The impact of a generic policy is similar to that discussed in section 3.4. Each
policy still acts to increase the gangs marginal cost of membership size and (in
certain cases) violence. For a given violence schedule, policies reduce the surplus
youths receive from joining the gang. As such, any increase in membership ne-
cessitates paying higher wages than before. This is compounded by the need to
maintain truthful revelation. If the gang o¤ers higher wages to new (low ability)
members, and does not ask them to inict more violence, then there will exist a
higher ability youth who will strictly prefer to accept the contract o¤ered to the
new members. The gang must therefore increase the wages of all its members (in-
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formational rent payments may increase). Given this increase in marginal cost,
the gang will optimally choose to reduce its size.
Policy may also a¤ect youthsresponse to changes in violence. In contrast to
the previous model, however, each youth inicts di¤erent levels of violence, so
the gang adjusts its violence schedule on a youth-by-youth basis. Assuming that
a policy a¤ects every youth in a similar way, each youth will require an increase
in their wages to compensate them for increases in the level of violence they are
required to inict. For given gang size, the marginal revenue product of violence
is una¤ected. So, once again, the gang will optimally reduce the amounts of
violence it requires its members to inict.
The overall e¤ect also depends upon the strength of revenue complementarity
between membership size and violence. If they are strong complements, we have
the following result, equivalent to Proposition 9 in section 3.4:
Proposition 14 (Policy with Separation and Complements) Suppose the
conditions given in Proposition 13 and Assumption 6 hold. Then any policy which
reduces either V or M and does not increase the other reduces both the amount
of violence each member of the gang inicts and the number of members the gang
chooses to recruit.
Consider a policy that reduces the gangs size. Under Assumption 6, gang
members are no longer able to take advantage of economies that were previously
available to them. As a result, the marginal revenue product of violence declines
for each gang member. The marginal cost of violence is una¤ected by changes
in size. Consequently, V < 0 for every gang member, and the gang chooses to
reduce the amount of violence it requires its members to inict.
Now consider a policy that reduces the amount of violence the gangs members
inict for each M . By the Envelope Theorem, the only e¤ect on the marginal
protability of size manifests itself in a decline of the personal marginal revenue
133
Recruitment to Organised Crime Policy with a Separating Gang
products of size of the inframarginal recruits. Consequently, M < 0 and the
gang chooses to reduce its size.
These two e¤ects reinforce declines in both gang size and the amount of
violence each member inicts, giving rise to the result in Proposition 14. If
Assumption 6 is satised, just as before, any policy will be e¤ective at reducing
the loss society su¤ers at the hands of the gang.
If increases in membership cause congestion, violence and membership are
relatively weak revenue complements. As with the simple gang environment, this
makes the policy e¤ects much more di¢ cult to predict. A policy that reduces
the gangs size increases the marginal revenue product of violence for each gang
member. With fewer members, each individual is able to extract greater rents
from the neighbourhood by employing violence. It could be the case that this
increase in marginal revenue exceeds any increase in marginal cost resulting from
the direct impact of the policy. If so, the gang will increase the amount of violence
each member inicts.
Similarly, any policy which reduces violence increases the marginal revenue
product of size. With the neighbourhood less satiated with violence, there are
greater opportunities for new members to generate revenue. Once again, if this
increase in marginal revenue exceeds the increase in marginal cost resulting from
the policy, the gang will opt to increase its membership.
This intuition is formalised in the following proposition, equivalent to Propo-
sition 10 in section 3.4:
Proposition 15 (Policy with Separation and Substitutes) Suppose the con-
ditions given in Proposition 13 and Assumption 7 hold. Consider any policy which
reduces either V or M and does not increase the other:
1. If M < M
R1
s=M
V  jVM je (s M )ds then the policy reduces the amount
of violence each member of the gang inicts, but increases size.
134
Recruitment to Organised Crime Policy with a Separating Gang
2. If M > M
R1
s=M
V  jVM je (s M )ds then the policy reduces the size of
the gang, and:
(a) Individual gang members for which V 
rMV
> jMj inict less violence.
(b) Individual gang members for which V 
rMV
< jMj inict more violence.
The conditions given in Proposition 15 are equivalent to those seen before.
Size is dened by M = 0. If, after a policy was enforced, size were to remain
unchanged, we would have:
M +M
Z 1
s=M
V VMe
 (s M )ds = 0 (3.26)
The direct decline in the marginal protability of size resulting from the policy
would be exactly o¤set by the increase in marginal protability resulting from a
fall in violence. The condition in case one states that there is an overall increase
in the marginal protability of size, resulting in a net increase in members. In
case two, the opposite is true. Note that, if every gang member inicts the same
amount of violence, (3.26) becomes M MV  jVM j = 0 () jVM j = MMV  =
M
V 
, exactly as before.
As di¤erent youths engage in di¤erent levels of violence, the e¤ect of policy on
violence is signicantly more complex than in Proposition 10. In particular, there
is no such thing as fMV . Instead, consider the e¤ect on the marginal protability
of violence of policy for a given level of violence:
V  + rMVM (3.27)
When a policy is implemented, its direct e¤ect may incorporate an immediate
decline in the protability of violence. However, if size also declines, the neigh-
bourhood becomes less congested. This enables each youth to generate more
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revenue through violence. The marginal cost of each youth increasing violence is
una¤ected by size, as changes in violence only a¤ect the informational rents of
those youths with higher ability. If the decline in gang size is su¢ ciently large,
the increase in the marginal revenue product of violence may dominate the fall in
protability caused by the policy. In this case, V  + rMVM > 0 and the gang
optimally increases the amount of violence the youth is required to inict. The
conditions given in Proposition 15 are thus precisely those that dictate whether
the marginal protability of violence increases or decline.
3.6.2 Results for Specic Policies
When the gang can discriminate between its members, and Assumption 6 holds,
the e¤ects of any of the policies I consider are unambiguous. Since all policies
direct e¤ects include reducing the marginal prot generated by membership size,
size declines. This causes a reduction in the marginal revenue product of violence
for all members, in turn endogenously reducing violence. Proposition 14 holds.
Under Assumption 7, the results are less clear, and are outlined below.
Severity of Punishment (f)
Increasing the severity of punishment only a¤ects the restricted demand for size.
It increases the expected cost of joining the gang. However, once a youth has
decided to join, it leaves their incentive to acquire criminal skills (and hence
their sensitivity to violence) unaltered. In order to maintain the size of the its
membership, the gang must increase the wages it pays to all of its members
for a given violence schedule (see (3.21)). If it were to attempt to attract new
members, it would need to o¤er them a higher wage as well. The marginal cost
of size has increased, as shown in (3.25). Since the violence schedule is as yet
una¤ected, the marginal revenue product of size remains constant, leading to a
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fall in the marginal protability of size, M < 0. The gang chooses to reduce its
membership.
The decline in size increases the personal marginal revenue product of vio-
lence. There is less congestion in the neighbourhood than there otherwise would
be, enabling each recruit to generate greater revenues through violence. As
the marginal cost of violence is accrued by each individual, it is una¤ected by
the falling gang size. The marginal protability of violence therefore increases,
V > 0, and the gang increases the amount of violence each youth engages in:
Lemma 9 Suppose the conditions given in Proposition 13 and Assumption 7
hold. Then any increase in the severity of punishment will result in fewer gang
members, but each member will increase the amount of violence they inict.
As in section 3.4, if society is relatively sensitive to increases in gang violence,
introducing more severe punishment across the board could lead to a increase
in the damage the gang inicts on society. Whilst membership does decline,
reducing the loss, each remaining member may become increasingly violent. This
can more than o¤sets these gains.
Primary Labour Market Policies (w)
The e¤ect of improvement in the primary labour market is, once again, identical
to an increase in the severity of punishment. As the opportunity cost of joining
the gang increases, the gang must o¤er the marginal youth a higher wage, given
the violence schedule. This increases the marginal cost of size in (3.25), whilst
having no e¤ect upon its marginal revenue product. The marginal protability
of size declines, and the gang optimally reduces its size.
Under Assumption 7 this reduces congestion in the neighbourhood, increasing
the marginal revenue product of violence for each member above its marginal cost.
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The gang therefore increases the amount of violence it requires each member to
inict:
Lemma 10 Suppose the conditions given in Proposition 13 and Assumption 7
hold. Then any improvement in the primary labour market will result in fewer
gang members, but each member will increase the amount of violence they inict.
Unsurprisingly, even under this more complicated wage setting, improvements
in the primary labour market can also yield greater social losses from the gang.
Arrest and Conviction Rate (p)
When there is an increase in the arrest and conviction rate, the marginal cost
of size increases. In a similar manner to the previous two policies, the expected
cost of joining the gang has increased, as it is more likely that an individual
will be punished (pf is higher in (3.21)). Furthermore, if youths are caught,
their wages are conscated. When deciding upon whether to join the gang, they
discount their wages for this possibility, and consequently require higher wages
to encourage them into a criminal career. With no equivalent increase in the
marginal revenue product, the marginal protability of size declines in (3.25),
and the gang chooses to reduce its size.
The marginal cost of violence also increases for every youth. Gang members
are only arrested after committing crime. However, it is during the commission
of crime that they inict violence. Irrespective of whether they are caught, they
therefore incur the cost of violence. The compensation they receive for doing so,
on the other hand, are conditional on their evading arrest. Consequently, when
the arrest rate increases, and gang members discount their wage further, any
increase in violence requires a more substantial increases in pay. With no change
in the marginal revenue product of violence (holding size constant), this causes
the gang to reduce the levels of violence it requires its members to inict.
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Combined, these two e¤ects give rise to the following result, equivalent to
Lemma 7:
Lemma 11 Suppose the conditions given in Proposition 13 and Assumption 7
hold. Then any improvement in the arrest and conviction rate may result in:
1. More gang members and less violence;
2. Fewer gang members and less violence; or
3. Fewer gang members and more violence.
Under Assumption 7, an exogenous decrease in violence for every member
increases the marginal revenue product of size. Similarly, a reduction in size in-
creases the marginal revenue product of violence for each member of the gang. It
is therefore possible that the reduction in violence may cause a su¢ cient increase
in the marginal revenue product of size to o¤set the increase in marginal cost.
This would create an incentive for the gang to recruit more members. In this
case, the marginal revenue product of violence would decline further, leading to
an additional reduction in violence, reinforcing the growth in gang size.
Conversely, the fall in gang size may cause a su¢ ciently large increase in the
marginal revenue product of violence as to o¤set the increase in marginal cost.
As such, the gang would increase the amount of violence it required its member
to inict (compensating them accordingly). In turn, this would further reduce
the marginal protability of size, leading to a further decline in membership.
Prevention of Juvenile Crime (k)
Increases in the prevention of juvenile crime reduces the restricted demand for
size. The cost of acquiring criminal skills increases. For a given violence schedule,
every prospective member of the gang invest less, and consequently su¤ers a
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greater disutility from the violence they are forced to inict. The marginal youth
is particularly a¤ected. As the youth with the lowest intrinsic ability, they are
more sensitive to changes in the cost of acquiring criminal skills, and consequently
reduce their skills dramatically. The cost of retaining their membership increases.
They require higher wages. This leads to increases in the informational rent paid
to all inframarginal members. The marginal cost of size increases. As, given
the violence schedule, there is no equivalent increase in the marginal revenue
product of size, the marginal prot associated with size declines (M < 0). The
gang optimally reduces the number of members it recruits.
Concurrently, the policy also reduces the restricted demand for violence. As
each youth incurs a higher cost of acquiring criminal skills, they reduce their
investment. In turn, this causes them su¤er a greater disutility from the violence
they are required to inict. Moreover, as they have lower levels of criminal skill,
they also become more sensitive to changes in violence. Each youth therefore
requires a greater level of compensation for any changes in the level of violence
they are required to inict. The marginal cost of violence increases for every gang
member. For a given gang size, there is no change in the marginal revenue product
of violence. The marginal protability of violence declines for all members (V <
0). The gang reduces every element of its violence schedule.
We have the following result:
Lemma 12 Suppose the conditions given in Proposition 13 and Assumption 7
hold. Then any improvement in the prevention of juvenile crime may result in:
1. More gang members and less violence;
2. Fewer gang members and less violence; or
3. Fewer gang members and more violence.
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As both the restricted demand for size and the restricted violence schedule
decline, the overall e¤ect is uncertain. The direct fall in demand for size increases
the marginal revenue product of violence. This may be su¢ cient to o¤set the
increase in the marginal cost of violence caused by greater di¢ culties in acquiring
criminal skills. As a result, the gang may choose to raise the amount of violence
it requires of its members. This would lead to a further decline in the marginal
revenue product of size, reducing size and reinforcing the increase in violence.
The opposite may also be true. The reduction in the restricted violence sched-
ule increases the marginal revenue product of size. If this exceeds the increase in
marginal cost caused by having to compensate youths more for acquiring crimi-
nal skills, the gang will increase its size. In turn, this would reduce the marginal
revenue product of violence for each individual member, again reinforcing the
increase in size.
Finally, it could be the case that neither endogenous increase in marginal
revenue product outweighs the direct increase in marginal costs caused by im-
provements in the prevention of juvenile crime. Both size and violence would
therefore decline.
3.7 Conclusions
Over recent years, numerous policies have been put forward to combat the social
loss associated with crime. These policies aim to decrease individualsincentive
to engage in crime and, in doing so, reduce the amount of crime that occurs. How-
ever, when applied to neighbourhoods where organised crime is prevalent, this
argument breaks down. When a policy is implemented, criminal organisations
may adjust its inputs, substituting towards increasing the intensity of violence.
This may increase the loss society su¤ers at the hands of organised crime.
This paper has shown the e¤ects of several popular policies in such an envi-
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ronment. As criminal organisations tend to operate within a well-dened geo-
graphical territory, they act as a monopsonist employer for all criminals within
that territory. Irrespective of whether the organisation operated a single wage or
more complicated recruitment strategy, results were shown to be robust.
The e¤ects of policy depend upon the degree of complementarity between
inputs in the criminal organisations revenue function. If they are strong comple-
ments, policies that one input reduce the marginal protability of the other. Both
size and violence decline. Conversely, if they are weak revenue complements, the
organisation may choose to substitute between size and violence, possibly undo-
ing the some of the e¤ects of the policy. In this case the loss society su¤ers may
increase.
When there is an incentive to substitute, policies which simply increase the
opportunity cost of joining a criminal organisation, such as improved labour
market wages or more severe punishment, fair badly. As they do not a¤ect
youthsincentive to acquire criminal skill, they actually reduce the marginal cost
of violence. Those who chose to remain in the organisation after the policy
is implemented are highly skilled. They do not require as much compensation
when violence is intensied. As such, criminal organisations will always choose
to increase violence, at the expense of membership.
Other policies prove more e¤ective. Prevention of juvenile crime and improved
arrest or conviction rates may cause an intensication of violence, but only in
relatively extreme circumstances. Otherwise, these policies diminish both the
organisations size and violence. Preventing juvenile crime not only increases the
opportunity cost of joining a criminal organisation, but also reduces the incentive
to acquire criminal skill. By doing so, it increases not only the marginal cost of
acquiring members, but also the marginal cost of violence. Improving arrest rates
have a similar e¤ect. As youths may be prevented from receiving their wages,
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they require more compensation ex ante for the violence they inict. As such, the
marginal cost of violence once again increases. If the degree of substitutability
between size and violence is particularly large, then the criminal organisation
may still choose to substitute away from size towards violence. Otherwise, it will
reduce both its size and the violence it inicts.
In summary, anti-crime policies are most e¤ective against organised crime
when they not only reduce the incentive of youths to join the organisation, but
also hamper its ability to increase violence.
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3.A Proof of Proposition 8
Firstly, note that M = N is never prot maximising, as it involves the gang
paying innitely large wages. Also, if V  = 0 or M = 0, equilibrium prot
for the gang, , is non-positive. So, to prove that the gang will operate with
positive V and M , it will be necessary to show that positive prots will result.
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Now, the rst order conditions for prot maximisation are:
V = MrV (M
; V )  M

cM (1  p)
 0
M = r (M
; V ) +MrM (M; V )  g (M; V )  V

McM (1  p)
 0
Given that the revenue function has constant returns to scale, rV +MrMV =
 V rV V =  MV (2rM +MrMM). Substituting appropriately, this yields second-
order conditions:
MM =   V

M
1
McM (1  p)

 + 1 +
1
M

1 +
1
M
+
1
M
1 + "M
2 + "M

MV =
1
McM (1  p)

   1
M
1 + "M
2 + "M

V V =  M

V 
1
McM (1  p)

 + 1  1
2 + "M

Necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a maximum are that MM < 0, V V <
0, and V V MM  2MV > 0. The rst of these conditions is satised unambigu-
ously upon inspection, since rV + MrMV > 0. The second condition is satised
if and only if  > 1
2+"M
  1. A su¢ cient condition is that  >  1
2
. Thirdly, we
require that V V MM > 2MV . With relatively little work, it can be shown that
this is satised if and only if:
 >
1 + 1
M
 
1 + "
2+"

+ 1
22M
2  1
2+"
+ 1
M
 
2 + "
2+"

+ 1
22M
 
1 + "
2+"
   1
A su¢ cient condition is that  > 0. So any point where both rst order conditions
are satised constitutes a local maximum. Rearranging these conditions yields:
MVV V
 < MMMV

Note that these inequalities do not simply hold at a point of prot maximi-
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sation - they hold everywhere. Therefore, assuming that the sign of MV never
changes, any prot maximising point will be unique.
Finally, it remains to show that the prot derived by the gang in any such equi-
librium is positive. From the rst-order conditions, we have that V MrV (M; V ) =
MV 
cM (1 p) andM
 (r (M; V ) +MrM (M; V )  g (M; V )) = MV cM (1 p)(lnN+ln(1 p) lnM) .
Noting that the gang level revenue function is homogeneous of degree one, it is
clear that:
 =
MV  (1 + lnN + ln (1  p)  lnM)
cM (1  p) (lnN + ln (1  p)  lnM)
> 0
This completes the proof. 
3.B Proof of Proposition 11
A contract is implementable if it is incentive compatible and individually rational.
Considering rst the issue of incentive compatibility, a youth has a strict incentive
to truthfully reveal their type if:
 = arg max
s0

(1  p) g (s)  pf   V (s)
c
  kJ

c


where c is a function of both  and V . Taking rst-order conditions, this is
equivalent to:
(1  p) @g
@s
()  1
c
@V
@s
()
Integrating both sides over the range [M ; ] yields:
g () = g (M) +
V ()
c (1  p)  
V (M)
cM (1  p)
+
1
1  p
Z 
t=M
V (t)
c2
@c
@t
dt
Now, for M to be the marginal youth, it must be the case that G (M ; M) =
w. Otherwise, if G (M ; M) > w, a lower ability youth will be able to gain a
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larger payo¤ by joining the gang and sending signal si = M , contradicting the
fact that M is the marginal youth. On the other hand, if G (M ; M) < w, then
the marginal youth would strictly prefer to join the primary labour market, again
providing a contradiction. So:
g (M) =
w + pf
1  p +
V (M)
cM (1  p)
+
k
1  pJ

cM
M

Also, we have that:
@
@

kJ

c


=
k

J 0

c


@c
@
  kc

2
J 0

c


=
V ()
c2
@c
@
  kc

2
J 0

c


So, by (3.18):
Z 
t=M
V (t)
c2
@c
@t
dt = k
Z 
t=M
@
@t

J

c
t

dt+
Z 
t=M
kc
t2
J 0

c
t

dt
= kJ

c


  kJ

cM
M

+
Z 
t=M
V (t)
tc
dt
Substituting, we have that:
g () =
w + pf
1  p +
V ()
c (1  p) +
k
1  pJ

c


+
1
1  p
Z 
t=M
V (t)
tc
dt
Finally, we must show that this is individually rational. The implementable
payo¤ from joining the gang is:
w +
Z 
t=M
V (t)
tc
dt
For any youth with  > M , the payo¤ from joining the gang strictly exceeds
the wage they would earn in the primary labour market. For the marginal youth,
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the two are equal. For any youth with ability less than the marginal youth, they
strictly prefer the primary labour market. This completes the proof. 
3.C Proof of Proposition 12
Before evaluating the prot maximisation problem, consider the expected cost of
informational rent for the gang:
I =
1
1  p
Z 1
s=M
Z s
t=M
V (t)
tc
dte (s M )ds
Performing a standard integration by parts yields:
I =
1
1  p
Z 1
s=M
V (s)
sc
e (s M )ds
so the gang leaderships objective function becomes:
N (1  p)
Z 1
s=M

r (M;V (s))  w + pf
1  p  
V (s)
c (1  p)

1 +
1
s

  k
1  pJ

c
s

e sds
Now, given gang size, for each   M , the restricted demand for V must
maximise  (M;V ) : It must therefore satisfy:
V = rV
eV ;M  1
c (1  p)

1 +
1

1 + "
2 + "

 0
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The associated second-order condition is:
V V = rV V

M; eV + 1eV c (1  p) (2 + ")

1 +
1

1 + "
2 + "

  "eV c (1  p) (2 + ")3 1
 
1 +
c

J 000
 
c


J 00
 
c

   "!
= rV V

M; eV + rV
eV ;MeV (2 + ")   "eV c (1  p) (2 + ")3 1
 
1 +
c

J 000
 
c


J 00
 
c

   "!
By assumption, the nal term is positive. So the second-order condition is
unambiguously negative if:
rV V

M; eV + rV

M; eV eV (2 + ") < 0
()  
eV rV V M; eV 
rV

M; eV  > 12 + "
Dening  ()  MrMV
rV
=  1   V rV V
rV
, as before, a su¢ cient condition is
 () >  1
2
. This completes the proof. 
3.D Proof of Proposition 13
Making liberal use of the envelope theorem, the gangs optimal size,M, satises
the following rst-order condition:
M = r^   w + pf
1  p  
V^
c^ (1  p)

1 +
1
M

  k
1  pJ

c^
M

+N (1  p)
Z 1
s=M
rM

M; eV (s;M)e sds  0
where r^  r

M; eV (M ;M) and V^  eV (M ;M). The associated
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second-order condition is:
MM = 2r^M   V^
MMc^ (1  p)

1 +
1
M
3 + 2"M
2 + "M

+N (1  p)
Z 1
s=M
rMV

M; eV (s;M) @ eV
@M
e sds
+N (1  p)
Z 1
s=M
rMM

M; eV (s;M)e sds
= 2r^M   V^
MMc^ (1  p)

1 +
1
M
3 + 2"M
2 + "M

+N (1  p)
Z 1
s=M

rMM   r
2
MV
V V

e sds
Consider the nal term:
I = N (1  p)
Z 1
s=M

rMM   r
2
MV
V V

e sds
= Mr^MM  M r^
2
MV
^V V
+N (1  p)
Z 1
s=M
rMMV
@V
@s
e sds
 2N (1  p)
Z 1
s=M
rMV rMV V
V V
@V
@s
e sds+N (1  p)
Z 1
s=M
r2MV
2V V
@3
@V 2@s
e sds
where r^
2
MV
^V V
= @
eV
@M
(M).By assumption:
N (1  p)
Z 1
s=M
rMMV
@V
@s
e sds  2N (1  p)
Z 1
s=M
rMV rMV V
V V
@V
@s
e sds
+N (1  p)
Z 1
s=M
r2MV
2V V
@3
@V 2@s
e sds < 0:
So:
MM < 2r^M   V^
MMc^ (1  p)

1 +
1
M
3 + 2"^
2 + "^

+Mr^MM  M r^
2
MV
^V V
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The right hand side is negative if and only if:
2r^M ^V V   V^
MM
r^V ^V V   V^
22MM
c^ (1  p) ^V V +M
r^MM ^V V  Mr^2MV > 0
() r^M r^V V + r^M + 1
M
r^M (r^V V + )  V^
22MM
c^ (1  p) (r^V V + )
+Mr^MM

   r^V
V^

  r^M r^V
V^
> 0
where   r^V
V^
1
2+"
  "eV c(1 p)(2+")3 1

1 +
c

J 000( c

 )
J 00( c )
  "

. Substituting for , and
given the properties of r (; ), it is possible to show that this is unambiguously
positive. Thus the second-order condition is invariably negative.
Now, in order to prove that this is prot-maximising, we need to show that
equilibrium prots are positive. Otherwise, the gang will simply shut down. Note
that, by the rst-order condition,  (M ;M) > 0, since rM < 0. Moreover, the
prot each youth generates for the gang is increasing in ability for any given size:
 (;M) =
kc
2 (1  p)J
0

c


+
eVi
c (1  p)
3 + 2"i
 (2 + "i)
> 0
So the gang must generate positive prots in equilibrium. This completes the
proof. 
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